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A STUDY OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE*
A.

CHALMERS MOLE AND LYMAN P. WILSONt

PART II
V.

VARIOUS STATE RULES ALLEVIATING THE HARSHNESS
Op THE COMMON-LAw RULE OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE

a. Workmen's Compensation Acts
In the vast field of master and servant the common-law rule of
contributory negligence proved too harsh. The common law governing the remedy of workmen against employers for injuries received
in the course of employment proved unsatisfactory in its results and
inconsistent with modern conditions. The remedy of the workman
was slow and inadequate; little of the cost to the employer reached
the workman, and that little at large expense to the public.' 4' Laborers clamored for legislation which would insure recovery without
necessitating that they prove negligence on the part of employers or
disprove negligence on their part.'4 In i88o, England commenced to
modify her law as to liability to employees for injuries, 43 and within
a short time virtually all of the countries of Europe and the provinces
*Copyright, 1932, by A. Chalmers Mole and Lyman P. Wilson. Part I of this
article appeared in the April, 1932 issue of THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY.
tThe authors are, respectively, a third year student and a Professor of Law in
the
Cornell Law School.
14
Theory: IDAHo CoMP. STAT. (i919) § 6214; Witte, Theory of Workmen's
Compensation (1930) 20 AM. LAB. LEG. REV. 411; New York Cent. R. R. v.
White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, ANN. CAs. 1917 D 629, L. R. A. 1917D x;
Ives v. So. Buffalo Ry., 2o N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, ANN. CAS. 19 12B 156, 34
L. R. A. (N. S.) 162, rev'g i4o App. Div. 921, 125 N. Y. Supp. 1125 (4th Dept.
1911).

14Jeremiah Smith, (1914) 27 H-Av. L. REV. 235, 240, commenting on the
English Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897: "The act takes the new line of
creating a duty on the part of employers to compensate workmen for accidental
damage irrespective of any fault on the part of the employees or their fellowservants. There is no need to prove any negligence of employers; and the workman loses his right by nothing short of his own serious and willful misconduct
being the cause of the accident. The act covers personal injury by accident arising
out of and in the course of employment. Sometimes the statute is defended on
the ground that it practically divides the loss between workman and employer."
'4EMPLOYERs' LIABILITy AcT (I880) 43 and 44 VICT., c. 42, construed in Gibbs
v. Gt. Western Ry., (1884) 12 Q. B. D. 208; infra note 157 for comments on
English Act of 1897, 6o and 6i VICT., c. 37; EMPLOYERS' LiAarLiTY AcT (iqo6),
6 EDw. 7, c. 58; but cf. history as set out in i IDAHo L. J. 56.
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of Canada had enacted similar laws. 1" The Federal Employers'
Liability Act of igo8'4' was an entering wedge for labor legislation
in the United States, and New York, Massachusetts, Wisconsin and
Minnesota led the field in passing workmen's compensation acts.4
A vast amount of employer's liability and workmen's compensation
law has been enacted in nearly every civilized country of the world,
and, at present, only four states in the Union have not adopted some
form of workmen's compensation. 47
The most striking feature of such workmen's compensation acts is,
perhaps, the provision abolishing the common-law defenses. 48 At
common law, if the servant's injury was due to the act of a fellowservant, or was due to a risk assumed by the employee or was contributed to by his own negligence, the master was not liable. Under
workmen's compensation law, unless the injury or death of the
employee is caused by his willful or wanton act, 49 he or his repre"'Wyoming ex rel. McPherren v. Carter, 30 Wyo. 22, 33, 215 Pac. 477, 480,
A. L. R. 1089 (1923), "In i88o England commenced to modify her law as to
liability for injuries to employees. The first compensation law was adopted in
Germany in 1897, and, about that time, practically all of the countries in Europe
and the Provinces of Canada enacted similar laws. The Federal Employers'
Liability Act was passed by Congress in 19o8. Massachusetts and nine other
states enacted a Workmen's Compensation Act in 1911, and since that time
similar legislation has been adopted in all, or nearly all, of the other states of the
Union. Public conscience, therefore, the civilized world over, has been decidedly
changed in the last forty years in its attitude toward those receiving injuries or
sustaining death during the course of employment."
"'Supra note 114.
'"New York was first in the field of workmen's compensation laws. Laws 19io,
c. 674, provided that the defenses of fellow-servant, assumption of risk and
contributory negligence were abolished in actions for injuries or death, in eight
listed employments. Difficulties arose with this law, for employers and employees coming within its purview had no path open except to conform to its
rather drastic provisions. A legal battle ensued, in Ives v. So. Buffalo Ry., supra
note 141, and the New York Court of Appeals held the law unconstitutional. It
was found necessary, in 1913, to amend the Constitution to authorize the enactment of such labor legislation (N. Y. CONsT. ART. I, § 9); Laws 1913, c. 816, reenacted 1914, Laws 1914, c. 41 allowed an election as to the remedy under the act
and that at common law.
"'7Hatch, Workmen's Compensation will Benefit South Carolina (1930) 20 AM.
LAB. LEG. REV. 383; Cochran, South CarolinaBalks at Compensation, ibid. 197;
Ross, Accident Compensation Needed in Mississippi,ibid. 383; Cooly, An Institute
on Compensation in Florida,ibid. 41.
"'8The various acts differ considerably as to phraseology; cf. complete review in
Hunter v. Colfax Co., 175 Iowa 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, ANN. CAS.
1 9 17E 803, L. R. A. 1917D i5.
1928 R. C. L. 83, notes 3-6; Bums's Case, 218 Mass. x58, io5 N. E. 6oi, ANN.
CAS. x916A 787, Sheldon, J., "serious and willful misconduct is much more than
mere negligence. It involves something of a criminal nature, the intentional
28
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sentative may recover, contributory negligence being no bar. Where
the compensation acts are elective, it is usually provided that if the
employer fails to come under the law, he may not in an action at
law set up the common-law defenses of fellow-servant, assumption
of risk or contributory negligence.150 In a number of states, question
was raised concerning the power of the legislature to abolish these
defenses. In 1917, the Supreme Court of the United States said,"'
"The scheme of the act is so wide a departure from common-law
standards respecting the responsibility of employer to employee
that doubts naturally have been raised respecting its constitutional
validity." The attitude of the courts rapidly changed, however,
and the Court of Appeals of New York, in Ives v. South Buffalo
Railway Company,15' although it held the New York act unconstitutional as a taking of property without due process, unequivocally
held that the power of the state to make changes in methods of procedure and the rules of law was clearly recognized, and that these
common-law defenses could be abrogated by legislative enactment.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Opinion of the Justices,'"
said that these three defenses were established by the courts, not by
the Constitution, and that the legislature might change them or do
away with them altogether.
The workmen's compensation acts clearly reflect the belief that
in the relation of master and servant the common-law rule of contributory negligence barring relief acts too harshly,M does not result
doing of something either with the knowledge that it is likely to result in serious
injury or with a wanton and reckless disregard of its probable consequences."
Cf. excellent note, (1923) 23 A. L. R. 1161; also (1919) 4 A. L. R. I16; (1920)
9 A. L. R. 1377; (1929) 58 A. L. R. 199.
150The Washington Act eliminates the entire subject of defenses by disallowing
the right of action for damages, CoMP. STATS. WASH. (1922) c. 7, § 7673 et seg.; in
the Iowa Act, a qualified right remains, dependent upon the attitude of employer
and employee respectively, as accepting or rejecting the act. When the employer
rejects the Iowa Act, he is deprived of these defenses whether the employee has
accepted or rejected, whereas if he accepts the law and the employee alone
rejects, all defenses are retained by the employer, IOWA CODE (1927) c. 70, § 1374;
Cf. 272 U. S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. 91; DosxER, MANUAL OF COMPENSATION

§ 62; Various acts provide that an employer who elects the act can rely on
the common-law defenses as against an employee who rejects the act, Wis. STAT.
(1927) § 102:01, 102:02, 102:04, 102:08; Karny v. Malleable Iron Co., i6o Wis.
316, 15IN. W. 786 (I915).
'New York Cent. R. R. v. White, supranote 141.
mSupra note 141.
1"2o9 Mass. 607, 96 N. E. 3o8 (1911).
1%2 REP. U. S. LABoR Comm. 637, "Able counsel, in an argument before the
United States Commission, contend that, where the sum recoverable under the
workmen's compensation act is only half the actual damage, the statute, in
LAW,

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
in fairness to either party and should, therefore, be abrogated in this
field. It is interesting to speculate whether application of the rule of
comparative negligence might not have obviated the necessity for the
enactment of labor legislation of such sweeping character,"'5 since this
rule would work a distribution of loss which, because it would be
proportionate to the fault of the respective parties, would be more
equitable than the now accepted doctrine of workmen's compensation. This view is rather vigorously expressed by Edwin E. Witte,
who says :1l
"The generally accepted theory of compensation will not bear
examination. Further, putting forward the indefensible proposition that the employer should bear the entire cost of accidents
makes it more difficult to secure an equitable division of the
costs of accidents. When we cease talking about industry's
bearing the entire cost of accidents, we may get support for a
program of splitting the total costs on something like a fiftyfifty basis, which would represent an immense gain over existing standards, even in the best laws."
effect, divides the loss in the case of a workman's contributory negligence. They
say, 'Few now would venture to maintain the justice of regarding contributory
negligence as a complete defense. This doctrine the civil and admiralty laws have
always rejected. But simply to abolish the rule of contributory negligence and
to make the employer liable for full damages just as if there had been no contributory negligence would not correct its injustice; it would merely shift the
injustice from the servant onto the master. The compensation law solves the
problem simply and justly by treating the cause of the iniury as it is, namely, a
joint fault, and dividing the loss accordingly, the employer paying his share in
compensation'."; Jeremiah Smith, supranote 142, at 345 says: "A workman may
(under the English workmen's compensation act of 1897) recover against a faultless employer, even though the workman himself were negligent and his negligence contributed to cause the damage unless his negligence were such as to
amount to 'serious and willful misconduct'. This is different from the case where
the maritime law divides the loss between two parties, both of whom are atfault."
Underusual workmen's compensation acts, fault on thepartof the employer isno
longer an element of the employee's right of action,nor need the employee plead freedom from contributory negligence, Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., supranote141, 289.
""Chief Justice Taft prefers workmen's compensation legislation to The
FEDERAL EmPLOYRR'S LIABLiTY ACT in the field of railroad employees. In
PROCEEDINGS OF THr, AMERIcAN LAW INSTITUTE (1929) 42, he spoke of the need
for a workman's compensation act for railroad employees, and developed the inadequacies of the protection accorded them under the act which has been extended
to the seaman, in contrast with the compensation acts of the state. Professor
Robinson, in PersonalInjury in the Maritime Industry (1930) 44 HARV.L. Riv.
223, 240, concurs with the Chief Justice and applies his comments to personal
injuries within the admiralty iurisdiction.

Cf. supra note

SHOREMAN'S AND HARBOR WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT,

U. S. C.

§§ 901-950

(I93I Supp.)

"'Theory of Workmen's Compensation, supra note 141.

14

o

44

, on THE LoNGSTAT. 1424,

33
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In industrial injuries, an equal division of the loss between industry and labor, or more properly, employer and employee, would
be an advance over either the common-law doctrine of contributory
negligence or placing the burden entirely on one party or the other, "
but it is submitted that an apportionment of the damage according
to the fault attributable to each party is preferable to any of these
rules.
b. State Employers' Liability Acts
The Federal Employers' Liability Act is exclusive in its sphere,
that of interstate commerce. 1 7 Fourteen legislatures, recognizing
the inherent fairness of the doctrine of comparative negligence
supplied by that act, whereby recovery is to be diminished according
to plaintiff's negligence, have enacted laws which are exact copies of
the federal act, and which cover all cases of intrastate carriers. 156
Seven other states have used the federal act as a basis for comparative
negligence statutes as to intrastate railroads. These statutes provide
that "contributory negligence shall not prevent a recovery where the
negligence of the person so injured or killed is of less degree than
the negligence of the officers, agents or employees of the railroad
causing the damage", but damages shall be diminished according to
such degree of negligence. 1 9 Still other states have statutes which
1

5Smith, supra note 142, 243, comments on probable results had the legisla-

ture abolished the doctrine of contributory negligence entirely: "Whether confining the abolition of this defense to suits by workmen only would not have been an
imiust discrimination in favor of that class, is an interesting question. We do not,
however, pause to discuss it, because we think that the doctrine of contributory
negligence as applied to any or all plaintiffs (i.e., to plaintiffs in general) is a
decadent doctrine, which will ultimately disappear from the law."
15 Supra note 123; Annotation, 45 U. S. C. § 51 (1926), c. 2, n33, P. 1O2; "The
opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States construing the Employers'
Liability Act or other Acts of Congress, is controlling not only upon the federal
courts, but the state courts as well upon the construction and interpretation of
the laws of Congress." Walker v. Iowa Cent. R. R., 241 Fed. 395 (S. D. Iowa
1917); Rodgers v. N. Y. C. R. R., 171 App. Div. 385, 157 N. Y. Supp. 583 (4th
Dept. 1916).
8
11 D. C. ANN. CODE (1929) Tit. 19, c. 7, § 82, p. 184; ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill,
1927) c. 114, § 323; IOWA CODE (1927) § 8158; KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923)
66: 238; Ky. REV. STAT. (1930) § 82ob2; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 4935;
MONT. REV. CODE (Choate, 1921) c. 36, § 66o6; N. C. CODE (1927) § 3467;
S. C. CODE Op LAWS (1922) vol. 3,4915; S. D. Comp. L. (1929) § 9707; TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. (1925) § 6440 (6449); VA. CODE ANN. (1924) § 5792; WIS. STAT. (1927)

§ 192.55 (2) (3); WYO. Comp. STAT. ANN. (1920) § 5387.
IISARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 8575; CAL.

STAT. (19ri) p.

796,

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AcT (Roseberry); MicH. Comp. LAws (1929) § 8630;
NEB. COMP. STAT. (1929) § 74-703; Niv. EmPLOYERS' LIABILITy AcT, 1915, § I,
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produce substantially the same effect as the Federal Employers'
Liability Act but differ in the extent of their operation. These differ
merely in wording or require a slightly higher degree of care on the
18 0
part of complainant in order to permit him to recover.
In Georgia it is said that the "fact that an employee may have
been guilty of contributory negligence, not amounting to a failure'to
exercise ordinary care, shall not bar a recovery, but the damages
shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee",' and "if the complainants
and the agents of the company are both at fault, the former may
recover, but damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion
to the amount of default attributable to him."'8 Florida's statutory
provisions are similar,"' and the recovery is diminished according to
plaintiff's negligence in all actions in specified hazardous employments
where there has been mutual fault. In Wisconsin, if the railroad
employee's negligence cooperated with that of the master, but was
less than that of the master, he may recover, the damages being
diminished.'6' Although the rules of contributory negligence are
now superseded by NEv. CoMP. LAws (1929) § 5651, enlarging its sphere of operation; N. DAK. CouP. LAWS ANN. (1913) § 4805; OHio GEN. CODE (Page ,1925) §
6245-1.

16
Several state employers' liability acts expressly provide that an action may
only be maintained when the employee who is injured is himself in the exercise
of due care and diligence at the time, IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 9433;
MASs. GEN. LAWS (1921) C. 229, § 3; ME. REV. STAT. (1916) c. 50, § 49; Cf. N. J.
COUP. STAT. (1925) p. 3042, and p. 4238; N. Y. ANN. CoNs. L. (1930), EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY, C. 17, § 4, (Laws 1921, c. 121); Kennedy v. N. Y. Tel. Co., 125
App. Div. 846, ixo N. Y. Supp. 887 (ist Dept. 19o8).
ANN. CODE (Parks, 1914) § 2783. See infra pp. 621-625.
"6'GA.
'62GA. ANN. CODE (Parks, 1914) § 2781; Cf. ibid. § 3131, providing that a
servant assumes the ordinary risks of his employment, and is bound to exercise
his own skill and diligence to protect himself. In suits by the servant, it must be
shown that the servant did not know of defects or dangers in the machinery, had
not equal means of knowing, nor by the exercise of ordinary care could have
known; Cf. ibid. §§ 3471, 3472, 3473, defining respectively ordinary diligence and

neglect, slight neglect and gross neglect; and ibid. § 4426, stating the comparative

negligence doctrine as it prevails in Georgia, infra pp. 621-625.
1nFLA. GEN. LAWS (Skillman, 1927) § 7052; Cf. ibid. § 7051, which imposes a
presumption of lack of due care against injuring railroad, where damage is done
to person or property. By ibid. § 7o6o, it is provided that where employee and
employer are both at fault damages shall be diminished according to default of
employee, but where the iniury is caused by sole neglect of the employee, with
his consent, or by common negligence of the employee and a fellow-servant, there
shall be no recovery.
'"WIs. STAT. (1927) § 192.55 (2) (3); Cox v. Chicago, etc. R. R., 159 Wis. 49!,
149 N. W. 709 (i914); Lese v. Chicago, etc. R. R., 154 Wis. 547, 143 N. W. 676
(1i3); Cf. Wis. Laws 193, c. 242, p. 375, creating § 331.045 WIs. STAT, which
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applicable in railroad cases in Oregon,' the legislature has provided
that the contributory negligence of an employee in certain building
and contracting trades shall not bar his cause of action, but merely
Arizona provides that there shall be an
reduce his damages.'
apportionment of damages in proportion to plaintiff's contributory
negligence in cases involving certain hazardous employments, 8 7
while in Arkansas, the comparative negligence doctrine applies in all
actions of an employee against an employer in any corporation not
engaged in interstate commerce; 8 in North Carolina, the doctrine
applies to railroads, including logging roads and tramroads.'8 9 The
provides that "contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action...
to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or
property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished
by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person
recovering." By this statute, Wisconsin adopts in its entirety the comparative
negligence doctrine.
6ORE. CODE ANN. (i930) §§ 62-1701, renders railroad liable for injuries to an
employee caused by his superiors; ibid. § 62-i702 provides that the rules and
principles of law as to contributory negligence will apply to cases under the act.
CODE ANN. (1930) § 49-706, "The contributory negligence of the
10RE.
person injured shall not be a defense, but may be taken into account by the jury
fixing the amount of damage," applying only in employee-employer cases of building owners, contractors, etc., specified in ibid. § 49-7o; Cf. Schaedler v. Columbia
Contract Co., 67 Ore. 412, 135 Pac. 536 (i913).
167ARiz. R.v. CODE (1928) § 1388; nothing less than sole negligence of injured
employee bars action, contributory negligence serving only to reduce damages
recoverable, Superior & P. Copper Co. v. Tomich, i9 Ariz. 182, 165 Pac. iio
(1917).

16SARx. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) §§ 7144, 7145, applicable to
mining and railroad companies as specified in ibid § 7137; Central Coal & Coke
Co. v. Barnes, 149 Ark. 533, 233 S. W. 683, (192I); Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v.
Jett, 32 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); Cf. ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses,
1921) § 714o, demanding that the negligence of complainant be of lesser degree
than that of the employer; and cf. ibid. § 8575, with provisions similar to those in
theFEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT; Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Johnson, 167 Ark. 464,

268 S. W. 31 (1925); El Bruce Co.v. Leake, 176 Ark. 705,3 S. W. (2d) 988 (1928).
'"N.
C. CODE (1927) § 3470; prior to enactment of this section, ibid. § 3465,
providing for a diminution of damages as to railroad cases, was held to apply by
judicial construction to logging roads and tramroads, Roberson v. GreenleafJohnson Lumber Co., 154 N. C. 328, 70 S. E. 630 (i911); Buckner v. Madison
County R. R., 164 N. C. 201, 8o S. E. 225 (1913); but it was held that a logging
road was not a carrier within § 3465 in Williams v. Kenston Co., 175 N. C. 226,
95 S. E. 366 (1918), thus the legislature passed § 347o; Cf. Lilley v. Interstate
Cooperage Co., 194 N. C. 250, x39 S. E. 369 (1927); Brooks v. Suncrest Lumber
Co., 194 N. C. 141, 138 S. E. 532 (1927); Moore v. Rawls, 196 N. C. 125, 144
S. E. 552 (1928); Stamey v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 197 N. C. 391, 148 S. E. 436
(1929);

Stewart v. Lumber Co., 193 N. C. 138, 136 S. E. 385

(1927).
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Ohio 170 and California 7' legislatures have adopted the rule that
"where the employee's contributory negligence is slight and the
negligence of the employer is gross in comparison", recovery shall
not be barred; the rule in these states extends to all employees, while
in Nevada the "slight-gross" statute covers mine or mill owners and
common carriers only. 72 In addition to its statute based upon the
Federal Employers' Liability Act,'73 Iowa enacted legislation making
contributory negligence a defense to be pleaded and proved by the
defendant in cases of an employee against an employer or by a passenger against a common carrier, and if contributory negligence on the
part of plaintiff is shown, it may be used only to reduce the amount of
recovery. 74
Tennessee holds as a matter of common law that where defendant's
is the first or more gross negligence, 75 plaintiff may recover; also, if
injury might have been avoided by the use of ordinary care and
caution by the defendant, although plaintiff clearly contributed to
his injury by his own negligence, defendant will be liable, contributory negligence merely reducing the damages. 7 6 This doctrine
applies to all cases of contributory negligence in Tennessee, 177 although later cases might appear to throw some doubt on the subject.
A statute 78 imposing certain duties upon a railroad has been construed by the Tennessee courts as if it had expressly provided that
'7oSupra note i59; Bartson v. Craig, 121 Ohio 371, 169 N. E. 291 (1929); Zeis
v. Kaechele, 29 Ohio App. 54, 163 N. E. 42 (1927) holds an instruction stating
that damages are to be reduced in accordance with the ratio which the contributory negligence of the employee bore to the negligence of the employer
erroneous. The jury must find whether plaintiff's negligence is slight, and the
defendant's gross in comparison, and if so, "to diminish damages in proportion
to the negligence attributable to the plaintiff as compared with the combined
negligences of plaintiff and defendant."
lnSupra note 159; Perry v. Angelus Hosp. Ass'n, 172 Cal. 311, x56 Pac. 449
(i916); Scherer v. Danziger, 178 Cal. 253, 173 Pac. 85 (1918).
'"Supra note i59; Lawson v. Halifax-Tonopah Min. Co., 36 Nev. 596, 135 Pac.
6I, 138 Pac. 261, aff'd 239 U. S. 632, 36 Sup. Ct. 220 (I915); Peterson v. Pittsburgh Silver Peak Min. Co., 37 Nev. 117, 14o Pac. 519 (1914).
174
17 3Supra note 158.
IowA CODE (1927) § 11210.
'Whirley v. Whiteman, i Head (Tenn.) 61o (1858).
"'6East Tenn., V. & G. Ry. v. Fain, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 128 (x885).
277L. N. & G. Ry. v. Fleming, I4 Lea (Tenn.) 128 (1885); in Dush v. Fitzhugh,
2 Lea (Tenn.) 307 (1879), it was said, "If defendant was guilty of a wrong by which
plaintiff is injured, and plaintiff also in some degree was negligent or contributed
to the injury, it should go in mitigation of damages, but cannot excuse or justify
the wrong of defendant." Cf. So. Ry. v. Pugh, 97 Tenn. 624, 37 S. W. 555 (1896);
Wylie v. Gr. Riv. Lumber Co., 8 Tenn. App. 373 (1928).
"'TENN. ANN. CODE (Shannon, 1917) § 1574, and cf. note, vol. i, at p. 1092,
citing numerous cases involving contributory negligence.
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contributory negligence on the part of an injured plaintiff should go
in mitigation of damages, although the statute does not so state. In
ChattanoogaStation Company v. Harper,T7 it is said that "the rule
in this State is that when the rights of the parties are to be settled
under the statute, which prescribes the precautions that railway
companies shall use to prevent [crossing] collisions on the track,
the contributory negligence of the person injured can be taken in
mitigation of damages. On the other hand, when the rights of the
parties are to be settled by the common law, the rule is that where
the negligence of the party injured contributed proximately to his own
injury, either alone, or, generally speaking, in conjunction with the
railway company, there can be no recovery; but in case the negligence of the railway was the proximate cause of the injury, and that
of the person injured contributed only remotely, then the contributory negligence can be used only in mitigation; but otherwise if the
negligence of the party injured was gross, although, in the absence of
such degree of negligence on his part, that of the railway company
would be treated as the proximate cause."
But in Tennessee Central Railway Company '. Page,180 which was an
action to recover damages for injuries received in a crossing collision,
plaintiff had driven his automobile over the railroad tracks without
having first stopped as prescribed by statute: It was held that although plaintiff's conduct was grossly negligent and a proximate
cause of his injury, the railroad was not excused from its duty,
statutory or otherwise, to protect life and property, and plaintiff's
negligence would not defeat recovery. The court said: "But the
naked violation of such statute by the plaintiff in negligence cases,
though controlled by the principles of the common law, would not in
every case defeat recovery. The causal connection between the violation of the penal statute and the accident, and generally the conduct
of both parties, is looked to, to determine liability, and if the negligence of plaintiff is imputed solely from the violation of the statute,
and he in fact exercised his intelligence and senses, and acted as a
reasonably prudent man to avoid injury, such violation of the statute
without more would not bar recovery for an injury flowing from the
wrongful act of the defendant".
Thus it would appear that Ten17'i38 Tenn. 562 at 581, 199 S. W. 394 (1917).
"&OTenn. Cent. Ry. v. Page, 153 Tenn. 84, 282 S. W. 376 (1926); Cf. So. Ry. v.
Matthews, 29 F. (2d) 52 ( C. C. A. 6th, 1929); Louisville & N. Ry. v. Anderson,
159 Tenn.,55, 15 S. W. (2d) 753 (1929); where negligence of deceased continued
to operate poncurrently with that of the railroad fireman who had failed to signal
engineer to stop, up to time of accident, no recovery allowed, Tenn. Cent. Ry. v.
Ledbetter, i59 Tenn. 404, 19 S. W. (2d) 259 (1929).
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nessee has attempted in its own peculiar wayto lessen the severities of
the common-law doctrine of contributory negligence, both at common-law 8' and in cases involving a statute, which in no way expresses or implies the duty to compare negligences or mitigate damages whether or not plaintiff's contributory negligence was a proximate cause of his injury.
Special state employers' liability acts providing for comparison
of negligence and diminution of damages according to plaintiff's
negligence form a considerable body of state legislation, and reveal
the modem tendency to overcome prejudice against the doctrine of
comparative negligence. States which have both an employers'
liability act similar to the Federal Employers' Liability Act and a
comparative negligence statute uniformly apply the former in employee-employer cases coming within its provisions. It is submitted
that this special labor legislation is superfluous in a comparative
negligence jurisdiction, and that the adoption of a comprehensive
comparative negligence statute in those states operating under the
common-law doctrine should obviate the necessity for making important exceptions, such as workmen's compensation acts and employers' liability acts, to the rule of contributory negligence.
c. Miscellaneous Statutory Provisions
There is a well known split of authority concerning the existence
of degrees of negligence. Five states expressly provide by statute
that there are three degrees of care and diligence, 182 and three degrees
of negligence,8 4 and attempt to define such degrees briefly.184 Four"'But cf. Bejach v. Colby, I41 Tenn. 686, 214 S. W. 869 (1919) and supra
notes
179 and 18o.
182
GA. ANN. CODE (Parks, 1914) § 3471; LA. REV. CIV. CODE (Merrick's 3d ed.
1925) § 3556 (W3); N. DAK. COMP. LAWS ANN. (1913) § 7280; OELA. COMP. STAT.
ANN. (1921) § 3530; and see various provisions in MONT. REV. CODES (Choate,

1921) § 7653, duty of gratuitous depositary; ibid. § 7768, slight care required in
re gratuitous act; ibid. § 7845, great care due from a telegraph company; ibid.
1 7853, contract exempting from liability for gross negligence forbidden; and cf.
ibid. §§ 7810, 7868, 7869, 7814, 7815. See Liston v. Reynolds, 69 Mont. 480, 223
Pac. 507 (1924); notes (1894) 38 Am. St. Rep. 322; (919) 4 A. L. R. 196, on
Duty and Liability of GratuitousBailees.
1

tGA. ANN. CODE (Parks, 1914) § 3471; LA. REV. CIv. CODE (Merrick's 3d ed.
1925) § 3556 03); OKLA. COMP. STAT. ANN. (1921) § 3532; N. DAK. CoMP. LAWS

§ 7282.
'VGA. ANN. CODE (Parks, 1914) § 3472, 3; LA. REV. CIV. CODE (Merrick's 3d
ed. 1925) § 3556 (13); OKLA. COMP. STAT. ANN. (1921) § 3531, 3; and see Interstate Compress Co. v. Agnew, 276 Fed. 882 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921); Mo., K. & T.
Ry. Co. v. Zuber, 76 Okl. 146, 184 Pac. 452 (1919); N. DAK. COMP. LAWS ANN.
(1913) § 7281, 3, and see famous banking case of Hart v. Hansom, 14 N. Dak.
570, 105 N. W. 942, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 438 (19o5).
ANN. (1913)
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teen jurisdictions recognize the several degrees of negligence at
common law,185 while twenty states assert that in the usual negligence action, it is impracticable, if not impossible, to separate ordinary negligence into several gradations. 8 The latter view is represented by statements of courts and writers such as is found in Thompson on Negligence,'17 that, "Such refinements can have no useful place
in the practical administration of justice. Negligence cannot be
divided into three compartments by mathematical lines. Ordinary
jurors, before whom, except in cases of admiralty, actions grounded
on negligence are always tried, are quite incapable of understanding
such refinements."' 8 8 On the other hand, the New York Court of
Appeals says, 89 "Irrespective of the decisions of other jurisdictions,
the courts of this state have uniformly recognized a distinction between ordinary and gross negligence ....

judge Allen wrote :'

'The

term itself (gross negligence) has been quarreled with, but it still has a
place in the law, and must have, as long as the measure of liability
implied by the term is recognized, and until some better term can
be invented to give expression to it'... . It has been defined to be the
want of that ordinary diligence and care which a usually prudent
man takes of his own property of the like description."' 8 '
Georgia, 9 2 of the five states providing by statute for recognition
of the varying degrees of negligence, is the only one which applies the
terms slight, ordinary and gross to negligence in personal injury
actions. Louisiana, despite the fact that its Code specifies these
degrees of negligence, 9 ' nevertheless in cases of personal injury
' 8sCalifornia, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Washington,
Wisconsin, New York. As to New York, see infra notes 189, 19o; but see Perkins
v. New York Cent. Ry., 24 N. Y. x96, 82 Am. D. 281 (1862); Collection of cases,
45 C. J. 664, n. 66.
'"Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont; and New York, on
the strength of the Perkins case, supra note 185, is sometimes cited as conforming
to this view; cf. infranotes 273 and 275; collection of cases, 45 C. J. 665, n. 78.
1871 THOMPSON ON NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. 19o1) § 18; supranote 3.
' 8sSupra notes 5-8, 49, 50, 75-78.
189Weld v. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 21o N. Y. 59, 71, 103 N. E. 957 (1913).
1
20Bank of Lyons v. Ocean Nat'l Bank, 60 N. Y. 278, 295, 19 Am. St. Rep. 181
(1875).

'9'See Altman v. Aronson, infra note 273; Massaletti v. Fitzroy, infranote 275;
(1919) 4 A. L. R. supra note 182.
l82Supra note 162; Georgia's comparative negligence rule is discussed in body of
article
infra, under section title State Comparative Negligence.
'8 Supra notes 182, 3, 4.
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frowns upon the doctrine of comparative negligence and distinctions
between degrees of negligence." 4 However, a recent Louisiana case"5
held defendant guilty of "the grossest kind of negligence and an
exhibition of a reckless and wanton disregard for human life and
human safety",'" and reversed the lower appellate court, 117 which
had reached the conclusion that the plaintiffhad "grossly violated""18
a rule of safe conduct, and thus had proximately contributed to his
"'Belle Alliance Co. v. Texas etc. R. R., 125 La. 777, 51 So. 846 (191o); and
in Mathes v. Schwing, ii La. App. 5 at 9,119 So. 557, 123 So. 156, rev'd 169 La.
273, 125 So. 121 (1929), Janvier, J. says, "Were we authorized, under the jurisprudence of Louisiana, to weigh the negligence of the defendants against that of
young Mathes, and to award a judgment in accordance with the result shown by
the scales, we would have no hesitation in saying that the defendants would
suffer as a result of that test, because, in our opinion, their negligence would
greatly outweigh that of the young man. However, in this state, in spite of the
provision of article 3556, CrvIL CODE, the doctrine of comparative negligence
is not recognized", citing cases; Rice v. Crescent City R. R., 51 La. Ann. IO8, 24
So. 791 (1891).
"'Mathes v. Schwing, supra note 194, in which a motorist emerged from
behind a standing street car at a speed of from fifteen to eighteen miles per hour,
and struck plaintiff's minor son who was alighting from the street car without
looking to see if the road were clear; statutes provided that motorists should stop
in such a situation, and that a person alighting from a street car should "make
sure the way is clear before crossing behind such car." The father sued in his own
right and that of his son, alleging negligence of defendants, who pleaded the
injured's contributory negligence. The jury returned verdicts for both father and
son; on appeal to the Court of Appeal, verdict and judgment was set aside and
plaintiff's demand in both capacities was rejected, finding no negligence in
defendants. On rehearing, original judgment was reinstated on ground of contributory negligence of the injured minor. On certiorarito the Court of Appeal,
prior judgment of the Court of Appeals was set aside and that of the district court
reinstated. See supra note 194, infra note 198.
"Ibid. 169 La. at 275.
"TIbid. ii La. App. 5.
"'Supra note 197 at 7, "We are forced to the conclusion that it (injured's
negligence) was of sufficent gravity to constitute contributory negligence and
thus to prevent recovery." Note that on appeal, supranote 196 at 278, the court
says, "We are in full accord with our learned brothers of the Court of Appeal in
their last pronouncement, wherein they found the defendants guilty of a much
higher degree of negligence than they attributed to (injured)," and at 283, the
court attempts to strengthen plaintiff's right to recovery, by adding, "We attach
no probative effect to the statement of the young man that the accident was the
result of his own fault. When he made the statement, he was in great agony and
in the control of the two men who had run into him. At that time he did not
know whether he was to die or get well, nor did he know whether he was being
conveyed to the hospital or to the river or woods. The men were strangers to
him. If he was in his right mind, it was more natural for him to exonerate rather
than to charge the two men with being responsible. The men had an interest and
a motive to draw the statement from the young man. They had to fear both
civil and criminal responsibility."
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injuries. In an earlier case,"19 the Louisiana Court of Appeal reversed the District Court and the appellate court which had agreed in
"finding that both the driver of the wagon and the engineer of the
locomotive had been negligent, but found a greater degree of negligence, or more culpable negligence on the part of the railroad, and so
condemned it in damages". 2°0 The Court of Appeal, in reversing,
simply said that comparative negligence does not prevail in Louisiana, 20' and found for the defendant. These two cases clearly show
the drastic results produced in particular cases by the common-law
'rule of contributory negligence; in one a clearly negligent plaintiff is
allowed full recovery from a negligent defendant, because the court
is bound to find wholly for one or the other party; in the other case,
despite the fact that it was found that the defendant was guilty of the
"more culpable negligence" in comparison to plaintiff's default,
defendant is let off scot-free, while the injured plaintiff is left to bear
the entire physical and financial burden. Such decisions as these are
all the more questionable when the statutes of the state provide that
there are three degrees of fault in law, the gross, the slight, and the
very slight.
It has been pointed out that workmen's compensation acts almost
universally bar contributory negligence of the injured employee as a
defense, 0 2 only intoxication or willful or wanton negligence operating
"'Belle Alliance Co. v. Texas, etc. R. R., supra note 194.
2°0Ibid. at 778, 5r So. at 846.
20
But see Frazier v. Hull, 127 So. 775 (1930), where defendant was "driving at
too great a rate of speed to permit her to stop her automobile or turn aside in time
to avoid striking the appellant" who was standing in the rear of his car after
having repaired a tire. Evidence conflicted on issue whether plaintiff's rear
light was burning as prescribed by statute. Reversing and remanding, the court
says, "the failure to have the rear light of the automobile burning, if such failure
there was, was more than a mere condition; it was a failure to discharge a duty
enjoined by the statute for prevention of the very thing that occurred, and, if
it was the sole proximate cause of the accident, would bar the appellant's recovery,
or if it merely contributed thereto, would diminish the amount of his damages."
(italics the author's); and note the shamefaced admission of the court in Rice v.
Crescent City R. R., supranote 194, "We have, in this state, no doctrine or rule
that the negligence or imprudence of a plaintiff, while not of the proximate
character to defeat his recovery, may yet be looked to by the jury or court in
mitigation of damages. Nevertheless, this court has constantly exercised its
discretion, within reasonable limits, of increasing or diminishing the sums awarded
for damages by the verdicts of juries, or the decrees of inferior tribunals, according as its judgment, operating on the facts, prompted in given cases... The facts
and circumstances of this case justify the reduction of the verdict of the jury
from $i2,5oo to $4,ooo." Were this statement followed at its face value, it would
be difficult to distinguish this theory from one providing for a comparison of
2
0Supra note r49.
negligences by the appellate court.
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to prevent his recovery.2°3 However, in a few such acts, what appears to be a desire for a theory of comparative negligence is evidenced by provisions that where accident is caused in any degree by
the failure of the employee to use safety appliances furnished, or to
obey the rules of the employer for the employee's safety, "the compensation for which the employer would otherwise have been liable
under this act, shall be decreased 15% in the amount of each payment" ;-204 conversely, if the employer is guilty of failure to comply
with any state statute and the injury is caused in any degree by such

failure, the employee's compensation is increased

15%.215

Also, if

the injured employee, or a fellow-servant with his knowledge, removes
a safeguard intended to protect the employee, unless by order of a
superior, the schedule of compensation shall be reduced Xo%.2U
Where the employer's liability is increased, the added recovery to
the injured employee is in the nature of a penalty for the employer's
gross negligence; but in the two cases in which it is decreased,' 7
without expressly so stating, the legislatures have provided that in
certain instances the employee shall be deemed guilty of an amount
of negligence which is mirrored in the reduced amount of his compensation under the act. The presence of these statutory reductions
is explained by the fact that under the older compensation acts
contributory negligence was no defense while willful or wanton
negligence20 9 involved a total forfeiture of all compensation, and it
was felt that there should be an equitable mean between these two
09
extremes.
Mississippi has adopted the comparative negligence doctrine in
its entirety in all personal injury and property damage actions.21'
Despite this, Mississippi gives full force and effect to several statutes
2

03Supra note i5o.

§ 4910; Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 3301.
Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 3301.
20
WASH. COMP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 7683 (io%).
207
Triola v. Tele. Co., 224 Mo. 258, 25 S. W. (2d) 518 (1930); Johnson v. HardyBurlingham Min. Co., 205 Ky. 752, 266 S. W. 635 (1924); Black Mt. Corp. v.
Higgins, 226 Ky. 7, io S. W. (2d) 463 (1928); Allen v. Columbus Miin. Co., 207
Ky. 193, 268 S. W. 1073 (1925).
2 08
Black Mt. Corp. v. Higgins, supra note 207, 11, 10 S. W. (2d) 464, "For an
employee to be guilty of willful misconduct, under the statute, his conduct should
24KY. REV. STAT. (1930)
200

involve an intentional, deliberate action with a reckless disregard of consequences
either to himself or to another---something less than voluntary self-infliction of
injury, but greater than gross negligence or wanton carelessness."
20
'Supranotes 154-6.
210
MxSS. CODE. ANN. § 511; and see ibid. § 512, making contributory negligence
a question of fact for the jury.
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which provide that running, flying, walking, or kicking a switch."'
backing into or along a passenger depot without certain safeguards, 12
and backing of engines at night without light and pilot213 shall be
unlawful, and that the railroad company committing such acts
shall be liable in damages, without regard to mere contributory
negligence of the party injured. The right of recovery, in cases
involving these statutes, is held to apply to property as well as to
persons injured, 214 and only willful negligence will bar plaintiff's
right."' It is said that these statutes were not intended to introduce
into Mississippi degrees of contributory negligence,216 and it is held
that they are not repealed, altered or modified by subsequently
enacted comparative negligence provisions. 17 Had these special
statutes not antedated the comparative negligence rule in Mississippi,
it is doubtful whether they would have been enacted, for they would
be unnecessary, since plaintiff's right would not have been cut off by
his contributory negligence.
Massachusetts, Virginia, Georgia and Florida provide by statute
for various forms of comparative negligence in railroad crossing
injury cases. Massachusetts states21 8 that if a person is injured, or his
property damaged, in a collision at a railroad crossing, the corporation is liable unless it "is shown that in addition to a mere want of
ordinary care, the person injured or the person who had charge of his
property was, at the time of the collision, guilty of gross or willful
negligence, 219 or was acting in violation of the law, and that such
gross or willful negligence or unlawful act contributed to the injury."
Rugg, C. J., says,220 "this statute has been in force in some form since
St. 1871, c. 352.221 It has been construed as relieving the plaintiff
2Ibid" § 6119.
213 Ibid. § 612o, 6121.
v. Thomas, 127 Miss. 174, 89 So. 907 (1921).
'Mobile & R. Co. v. Campbell, 114 Miss. 803, 75 So. 554 (1917); Ala. R. R. v.

2n-1id.

§ 6118.

214
Davis
21

Jones, 73 Miss. ITO, 19 So. 1O5, 55 Am. St. Rep. 488 (1895); Ill.
Cent. R. R. v.
Archer, 113 Miss. 158, 74 So. 135 (1917); Pulliam v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 75 Miss. 627,
23 So. 359 (1898); Davis v. Thomas, supranote214.
216Pulliam v. Ill. Cent. R. R., supra note 215.
91
Mobile & R. Co. v. Campbell, supranote 215; in Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Archer,
supranote 215, section 6118 is termed "our concurrent negligence statute."
218MAss. GEN. LAws (1921) C. 16o, § 232.
21

See Massaletti v. Fitzroy and Altman v. Aronson, infra notes 275 and 273,
discussing and defining gross negligence in Massachusetts.
2t
Duggan v. Bay State St. Ry., 230 Mass. 37o at 381, 119 N. E. 757, L. R. A.
x918 E, 68o (1918), citing La Fond v. B. &M. R. R.,2o8Mass.451,94N.E. 693
(19r1); Slattery v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 203 Mass. 453, 89 N. E. 622 (1909).
21
r The statute rendered the railroad liable to indictment in such crossing injuries; see Brooks v. F. & L. St. Ry. 200 Ma. R at I5. 8t N. E. 289 (19o8); Cf.
Mass. St. 1898, c. 565.
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from the burden of proof in respect of due care and imposing a heavy
burden of proof upon the defendant as an affirmative defense. Although many cases have arisen under this statute, its constitutionality
has never been doubted." The burden of proving gross negligence
under these acts is on the defendant,2 2 and, if proved, it is imputed
to the other occupants of the car,22 barring their recovery also.
Several cases decide that the court may, as a matter of law, hold
the plaintiff guilty of gross negligence,2 4 but it is rarely true that,
in the absence of binding admissions or agreements as to fact, a
ruling can be given that as matter of law the material fact of gross
negligence has been proven.'
Virginia'sns statute provides that "the fact that a traveler on
such highway failed to exercise due care in approaching such crossing
shall not bar recovery for an injury to or death of such traveler,
nor for an injury to or the destruction of property in his charge...
but the failure of the traveler to exercise such care may be considered in mitigation of damages." This section does nothing more
than substitute for the doctrine of contributory negligence a kind
of comparative negligence in cases of a collision on a highway crossing. 227 If the negligence of the plaintiff contributed to causing the
injury, it may and must be considered in mitigation of damages, 218
although the permissive "may" is used in the statute. Under this
section, plaintiff must prove not only the railroad's failure to give the
prescribed signals and his injury, but a causal connection between
such failure and his injury. As stated in a recent case, 2 9 it is "the
cardinal principal... that regardless of the negligence or lack of
21Lenihan v. B. & M. R. R., 26o Mass. 28, 156 N. E. 857 (1927).
mLewis v. B. & M. R. R., 263 Mass. 287, i6o N. E. 663 (1928).
224
"Gross or willful negligence is more than mere negligence, as these words are
used in the statute; but the distinction between them is one of degree. Where
the question is whether a given condition of things amounts to negligence, this
court in numerous cases has asserted its right to say that negligence existed, and
that therefore the plaintiff could not recover. , The same must be true as to
negligence in a higher degree." Lathrop, J., in Emery v. B. & M. R. R., I73 Mass.
136 at 138,53 N. E. 278; Cf. Deggins v. Old Colony R. R., i54 Mass. 402,28 N. E.
274 (189i).
2
uBrusseau v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 187 Mass. 84, 72 N. E. 348 (1905);
Kelsall v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., i96 Mass. 554, 82 N. E. 674 (1907); Phelps v.
N. . R. R., 172 Mass. 98, 5i N. . 522 (1898); Copley v. N. H. & N. R. R., 136
Mass. 6 (1883).
n9 VA. CODE ANN. (1930) 3959.
22 7
Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Hardy, 152 Va. 783, 148 S. E. 639 (1929).
22
1 Virginian Ry. v. Haley, (Va. X931) 157 S. E. 776; Cf. Virginian Ry. v. Bacon,
(Va. 1931) 157 S. E. 789; Norfolk & W. Ry. v. White, (Va. i93i) 16o S. E. 219;
Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Hardy, sxpra note 227.
='Virginian Ry. v. Haley, supra note 228, 784.
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negligence of the plaintiff, there can be no recovery unless there was
a causal connection between the failure to give the signals and the
injury, and that the establishment of a causal connection between
the failure to give the signals and the injury is an essential element
of the plaintiff's case. Proof of the failure to give the prescribed
signals and proof of the injury, and nothing more, are not of themselves sufficient to support a recovery... A causal connection between
the failure to give the signals and proof of the injury will no more be
assumed, than that the defendant failed to give the signals or that
the plaintiff was injured." However, if the failure to give the signals
in any way contributed to the injury, it has been held in Virginia
that the traveler may recover, no matter how grossly negligent he
may have been, subject of course to mitigation of damages in proportion to his negligence.2"0
Counsel in a recent case' s3 argued that the duty upon a railroad to
keep dangerous public crossings guarded was similar to the duty of
giving proper signals upon approaching the crossing, and that certainly in the former no recovery could be had by a negligent plaintiff;
the court countered by saying,"' "We quite agree with counsel
for the railway company in their contention that if the sole question
of negligence relied on in the instant case had been the failure of the
watchman to be at the crossing to stop travelers from crossing on
the approach of trains, there could have been no recovery by the
plaintiff, for the reason that there is no provision for apportionment
of negligence in such a case and the deceased's contributory negligence would have barred recovery." A West Virginia judgep3 says,
"I am apprehensive that this statutem has colored the view of the
Virginia Courts in other cases involving personal injuries, and I do
not consider the more recent Virginia decisions on the doctrine of
contributory negligence as Simon-pure as of yore" s
It is to be
hoped that other instances of similar statutes will be enacted in
Virginia, with the ultimate result that the comparative negligence
theory will be applied in all personal injury cases.
23

Southern Ry. v. Johnson, r51 Va. 345, 146 S. E. 363 (1929); Etheridge v
Norfolk So. Ry., I43 Va. 789, 129 S. E. 68o (1925); Gregory v. Seaboard Air Line
Ry., 142 Va. 750, 128 S. E. 272 (1925).
2lSouthern Ry. v. Johnson, supra note 230.
r23_b0d. 348.
3
Hatcher,
J., dissenting, in Smith v. Gould, (W. Va. 1931) 159 S. E. 53, 6I.
2"Hatcher, J., refers particularly to VA. CODE ANN. (1930) § 5792, supranote 158.
IsHatcher, J., comments also as follows on a Missouri statute: "In 1907 a
statute was enacted by the Legislature of Missouri, which repealed the commonlaw rule of contributory negligence by imposing upon the operator of an automobile on a public road or street 'the highest degree of care that a very careful
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The Georgians and FloridaP7 statutes are similar to, but more
inclusive than, the Virginia or Massachusetts enactments; e~ch
of the former states provides that "no person shall recover damages
from a railroad company for injury to himself or his property, where
the same is done by his consent, or is caused by his own negligence.
If the complainant and the agents of the company are both at fault,
the former may recover, but the damages shall be diminished or
increased by the jury in proportion to the amount of default attributable to him." The Florida court states, in Louisville 6' Nashville Railroadv. Y-niestra,n8 in 1886:
"I feel constrained to say in conclusion that in my opinion,
and speaking for myself individually, the operation of the
principle of contributory negligence is unjust and inequitable.
By the law, as it unquestionably stands, no -matter how negligently or with what amount of care trains are run, if a person
injured by one of them has failed to exercise care on his part, he
cannot recover. As it happens in nearly every instance of
collision, if not all, that the person on the track is alone injured
or killed, the train receiving no damage, there is no present
incentive of personal safety on the train hands to use caution,
nor a fear of being compelled to make pecuniary compensation
when they can rely upon being absolved from their admitted
negligence by some careless act of the plaintiff. The law says
you were both at fault, and draws from that premise the conclusion that one alone must bear all the damage, provided that
one is the plaintiff... Various reasons have been given by judges
and commentators in justification of this, to my mind, narrow
rule--that it is required by public policy, that the injury was of
the plaintiff's own producing, and that the 'law has no scales to
determine in such cases whose wrong doing weighed most in the
compound that occasioned the mischief'. In another branch of
jurisprudence these reasons have not been found potent, its
'scales' seem better adjusted, and from the same premises of
both plaintiff and defendant being in fault is drawn the more
rational conclusion that the damages must be equally apportioned between them. This rule in admiralty courts has so
commended itself that by act of Parliament (36 and 37 Victoria)
person would use, under like or similar circumstances, to prevent injury', and by
making such operator liable in damages for failure to use such degree of care,
unless the injury was caused 'by the direct negligence of the injured or deceased
person contributing directly thereto.' REv. STATS. (Mo.) 19o9, § 8523. This
statute has been modified from time to time, but it still exacts of an automobile
operator the highest degree of care." Such law became Laws 1921, Extra Session,
p. 91, § 19; Cf. 2 THOMPSON ON NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. 19oz) § 1476.

26GA. ANN. CODE (Parks, 1914) § 2781.
2 7FLA. GEN. LAWS (Skillman, 1927) § 7052; and see ibid §§ 7051, 7o6o, 4424-6.
23821 Fla. 7oo at 737, 738, McWhorter, 0. J. Cf. Florida So. Ry. v. Hirst, 3o

Fla. x, iI So. 5o6, 16 L. R. A. 631 (1892).
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it is made the rule of the other courts in like case, where it used
not to be. The law, in cases at least where human life is concerned, certainly needs legislative revision."
The Chief Justice's suggestion was acted upon in the next legislative session,239 and the resultant enactment was the forerunner
of the statute quoted above. The comparative negligence doctrine
supplied by this statute extends solely to cases of injury by railroads, 40 or to employer-employee cases in hazardous occupations.2 4'
The Florida legislature also has placed a statutory presumption of
lack of due care upon a railroad causing damage;24 the presumption
does not outweigh proof, and ceases upon defendant's showing that
its agents exercised due care.2 When no evidence is submitted upon
which the jury could find a verdict for plaintiff, the court may direct
th6 verdict for defendant,2 but any evidence of negligence on the
part of defendant precludes a directed verdict. The Florida courts
follow the rule of apportionment of damages in the Federal Employers' Liability Act,46 that "the statute contemplates that the
amount of the recovery shall be such a proportion of the entire
damages sustained, as the defendant's negligence bears to the combined negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant in the
premises." According to the terms of the statute, sole negligence
of plaintiff will bar him, 247 but if his negligence is merely greater
than that of defendant, it operates only to reduce his recovery.48
2"C. 3744, approved 1887, superseded 1891 by c. 4071; See F. C. & P. Ry. v.
Foxworth, 41 Fla. i, at 63,25 So. 338,79 Am. St. Rep. 149 (1899), stating, "Under

these provisions contributory negligence is not a complete defense in bar, but
operates only in reduction or diminution of damages. The plaintiff is entitled to
recover if defendant's negligence was one of the proximate contributing causes of
the injury to the deceased, notwithstanding the deceased's negligence was greater
than that of the defendant. This statute does not introduce into this State the
Illinois doctrine of comparative negligence nor that prevailing in the State of
Georgia."
24
'Carter v. J. Ray Arnold Lumber Co., 83 Fla. 470, 91 So. 893, (1922), rehearing denied, 91 Fla. 548 (1926); Cummer Lumber Co. v. Silas, 98 Fla. I158, 125 So.
372 (1929).
WlFLA. GEN. LAWS (Skillman, 1927) § 7060, supra note 163.
*Ibid.§ 7051, supra note 163.

24

Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Myrick, 91 Fla. 918, 109 So. 193 (1926); Atlantic
Coast L. Ry. v. Watkins, 97 Fla. 350, 121 So. 95 (1929); S.A. L. Ry. v. Smith,
53 Fla. 375, 43 So. 235 (1907); Covington v. S. A. L. Ry. 99 Fla. 1107 (1930).
2 4
Fla. East Coast Ry. v. Nance, 96 Fla. 171, 117 So. 842 (1928); Stevens v.
Tampa
Blec. Co., 81 Fla. 512, 88 So. 303 (1921); ibid. 523, list of cases in point.
24
Atlantic Coast L. Ry. v. Callan, 73 Fla. 688, 74 So. 799 (1917).
24645

2 7

U. S. C. §§ 51-59 (1926), see anno. 53; supra note 114.

1 Atlantic Coast L. Ry. v. Watkins, supra note 243; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
Myrick, supranote 243; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Tomberlin, 7o Fla. 435, 70 So.
437 (19x5); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Bouquardez, 72 Fla. I6I, 72 So. 668 (1916).
248
Germak v. Fla. East Coast Ry., 95'Fla. 991, 117 So. 391 (1928); L. & N. Ry.
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Since Florida has adopted4 9 the recent startling rule of Justice
Holmes that, "if a driver cannot be sure otherwise whether a train
is dangerously near, he must stop and get out of his vehicle, although
obviously he will not often be required to do more than stop and
look",25 0 it would appear that every plaintiff injured at a crossing
would be subject to the rule of diminution of damages,251 for drivers
do not in fact consider it incumbent upon them to stop, get out of the
v. Norton, 75 Fla. 597, 78 So. 982 (1918); Atlantic Coast L. Ry. v. Wier, 63 Fla.
69, 58 So. 641 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 307, ANw. CAS. 19i4A, 126, (1912); Davis v.
Cain, 86 Fla. IS, 97 So. 305 (1923); Stevens v. Tampa Elec. Co., supra note 244;
Atlantic Coast L. Ry. v. Callan, supra note 245; in the Watkins case, supra note
247, Ellis, J., says, "While we think that both the company and its engineer were
at fault in the lack of reasonable prudence with which the train was operated at
that point, the degree of recklessness and lack of prudence shown by Mr. Watkins
was vastly greater. In this view of the case we think the judgment should be
reversed unless the defendant in error will enter a remittitur of $5ooo (on $Io,o0O
verdict); otherwise the judgment will be reversed." And in Claughton v. Atlantic
Coast L. Ry., 47 F. (2d) 679 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931), deceased was negligent in failing
to have his car under control as it approached the crossing and to look out for
possibly approaching trains, while the railroad's agents were negligent in operating the train at an excessive speed, in failing to blow the whistle or ring the bell,
and in not having the train under such control that it might be stopped before
reaching the crossing; the Federal court consequently reversed the case and
remanded it.
2
"Germak v. Fla. East Coast Ry., supra note 248; Atlantic Coast L. Ry. v.
Watkins, supra note 243.

noHolmes, 5., in B. & 0. R. R. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66 at 70, 48 Sup. Ct. 24,
56 A. L. R. 645 (1927).
?"The rule seems to apply, as does also the Goodman rule, even where there is a
flagman and light signals; an excellent example is Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
Ebert, 138 So. 4 (Fla. 1931), rehearingdenied Nov. IS, 1935, 538 So. at x2, an
action for wrongful death of plaintiff's husband brought against a flagman and
two railroad companies. Tracks of the two railroads crossed a city street, a flagman being employed jointly by the two railroads; plaintiff, driving her car, saw
the signal light turn red, warning of an approaching train; she waited until the
light turned green, and then, assuming that all was clear, started to cross; when on
the crossing, the light again turned red and plaintiff attempted to back from the
crossing, plaintiff's husband getting out of the car to save himself; the car was
hit and the husband killed. Held, the driver was contributorily negligent. "The
traveler should not leave undone any reasonable thing that the law requires that
he should do for his own safety; that a person fails to do so, relying solely upon
the signals given by the flagman, goes to the question of contributory negligence
and in this state affects the amount of damages recoverable." On rehearing, the
court says, "The amount of damages sought by the plaintiff was $5o,ooo; the
amount of the verdict was $i5,ooo. The evidence would have warranted a larger
verdict if there had been no contributory negligence on the part of Mrs. Ebert
(the driver)." Twelve judges concur, on appeal and rehearing, in the result
reached. Cf. Smith, Watkins and Myrick cases, supra note 243; Davis & Weir
cases, supra note 248, Germak case, supra note 249.
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car and look, and then enter the car again before starting, in order to
feel that they need have no further fear of injury from passing trains;
indeed, such an assumption of safety would be unwarranted, since the
situation might have changed after the driver re-entered his car.
Georgia's method of dealing with mutual negligence in crossing
cases differs somewhat from that of Florida, although Florida had
copied the statute from the Georgia Code and thus it would ordinarily
follow that the interpretations would be similar. As in Florida, a
statutory presumption of negligence25 2 arises against the defendant
railroad upon proof by the plaintiff that the railroad has harmed
him; the burden of proof of due care and diligence must then be
sustained by the defendant, 253 or he must show that the injury was
done by plaintiff's consent, or occurred by reason of plaintiff's sole
negligence; also, mere negligence of the plaintiff, without reference
to its causal connection with the injury or to its degree as respects
the railroad's negligence, will not defeat recovery.2M But at this
point the Georgia courts differ from the Florida courts in interpretation of the statute, in that the former apply a different rule of
damages, apportioning them directly with the amount of default
attributable to plaintiff. 25 Thus where his negligence is equal to or
greater than that of the defendant, plaintiff may not recover any
asGA. ANN. CODE (Parks, 1914) § 2780; See Central of Ga. Ry. v. Barnett, 35
Ga. App. 528, I34 S. E. 126 (1926); Barrett v. So. Ry., 41 Ga. App. 70, 151 S. E.
69o (193o), where presumption was removed by introduction of rebuttal testimony, yet it was held plaintiff may recover, for jury could have inferred that
defendant was guilty of negligence as alleged in the petition; Ga. Ry. & Power Co.
v. Shaw, 4o Ga. App. 341, 149 S. E. 657 (1929), presumption rebuttable by proof
of ordinary and reasonable care and diligence. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE, (2d ed.
1923) § 2491, "The peculiar effect (of such a presumption) is merely to invoke a
rule of law compelling the jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence
to the contrary from the opponent. If the opponent does offer evidence to the
contrary, the presumption disappears as a rule of law, and the case is in the
jury's hands, from any rule." i Cf. GREnELEAF ON EVIDENCE, (i5th ed. 1899)
§ 33;
Ga. So. Ry. v. Sanders, miiGa. 128, 36 S. B. 458 (i9oo).
2
OCentral of Ga. Ry. v. North, 129 Ga. io6, 58 S. E. 647 (1907).
25
'So. Ry. v. Reed, 4o Ga. App. 332, 149 S. E. 582, cert. den. 40 Ga. App. 849
(1929); L. & N. Ry. v. Stafford, 146 Ga. 2o6 at 209, 91 S. B. 29 (1916); LimeCola Bottling Co. v. Atl. & W. P. Ry., 34 Ga. App. io3 (2), 128 S. E. 226 (1925);
Barrett v. So. Ry., supra note 252.
mWestern & Ati. R. R. v. Ferguson, 113 Ga. 709, 39 S. E. 3o6 (Igoi); Atlantic
Coast L. R. v. Solomon, 37 Ga. App. 737, 141 S. B. 917 (1927); L. & N. R. v.
Stafford, supra note 254; So. Ry. v. Reed, supra note 254; Central R. R. v. Larson, 19 Ga. App. 413, 91 S. E. 517 (1917); Macon R. R. v. Holmes, io3 Ga. 655,
30 S. B. 563 (1897); Macon R. R. v. Johnson, 38 Ga. 409 (1867); Comer v. Barfield, 1o2 Ga. 485, 31 S. E. 89 (1897).
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damages ;256 also, the Georgia cases state that if the person killed or
injured brought about his injury by his own carelessness amounting
17
to a failure to use reasonable care and diligence, he cannot recover.
This statement is most misleading, as one infers immediately that
Georgia applies the majority rule of contributory negligence, although the results reached by the cases point conclusively to the fact
that the comparative negligence doctrine is used. The statement
comes from a separate statute 8 which demands of plaintiffs that
they use due care and diligence to avoid the consequences of defendant's neglect; however, by judicial decision, it is held consistently
that a plaintiff cannot avoid the consequences of another's neglect
until such neglect is operating and has either been brought to plaintiff's attention, or it can be held that as a reasonably prudent person
he should have had reason to apprehend its existence.2 9 Thus,
despite a seemingly repugnant due care statute applicable to the same
set of facts, the Georgia courts allow a recovery to a negligent plaintiff
according to the obvious intention of the legislature, as expressed
in the concurrent negligence statute covering injury by railroads.
d.

Statutes Limiting Liability of Owner or Operator of Automobile
for Injuries to Guest

In eight states the legislatures seem to have recognized the serious
increase in the evils of vexatious litigation between host and guest,
the great opportunities for collusion between the parties in such
cases when an insurance company is in fact the real party in interest,
the consequent fraud upon the court and the risk of manufactured
2wSo. Ry. v. Reed, supra note 254; Atlantic Coast L. Ry. v. Solomon, supra
note 255, distinguishing between rule in Georgia and that of the FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIALITY ACT, 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-59 (1926); Christian v. Macon Ry. &
L. Co., 12o Ga. 314, 47 S. E. 923 (I9O4); Georgia &F. Ry. v. Newton, 14o Ga. 463,
79 S. E. 142 (1913); Central R. R. v. Newman, 94 Ga. 564, 21 S. E. 219 (1895);
So. Ry. v. Watson, 104 Ga. 243, 30 S. E. 818 (1898).
257
Falling in pit on right of way, Central R. R. v. Henderson, 69 Ga. 715 (1882);
So. Ry. v. Hogan, 131 Ga. 157, 62 S. E. 64 (19o8); sitting on track, Moore v. So.
Ry., 136 Ga. 872, 72 S. E. 4o3 (1911); same, even though company negligent,
Raden v. Ga. R. R., 78 Ga. 47, 3 S. E. 257 (1887); walking on trestle at night,
Ga. Pac. Ry. v. Richardson, 80 Ga. 727, 7 S. E. I19 (1888); same, two females,
Phillips v. East Tenn., Va. & Ga. Ry., 87 Ga. 272, 13 S. E. 644 (1891); same,
young boy, Atlanta & C. Ry. v. Leach, 91 Ga. 419, 17 S. E. 619 (1893); degree of
diligence demanded of one using tracks as passway is that which every prudent
person who puts himself unnecessarily in a perilous situation must use, Central
R. R. v. Raiford, 82 Ga. 4o0 (2), 9 S. E. 169 (1889).
258
GA. ANN. CODE (Parks, 1914) § 2782; Cf. ibid. §§ 4424, 5, and see supra note
259
Cases cited supra note 255.
162.
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claims, to say nothing of the basic injustice of permitting a bare
invitee to sue his invitor for merely minor derelictions 60 As a result
each of these states has adopted an act which provides in effect that a
guest passenger in an automobile shall have no cause of action against
the owner or operator for harm, unless such injury shall becaused
by the wanton or willful misconduct of the operator or owner, or
caused by his heedless and reckless disregard of the rights of others.261
In all of these states, these statutes, thus modifying the common-law
rule of liability for ordinary negligence have been attacked as unconstitutional, 62 but in each they have been sustained.
While these statutes do not provide for the rule of comparative
negligence, they do reveal the willingness to modify the normal
pattern of liability for negligent conduct where justice in a given
situation demands it. Accordingly, they classify negligence into
2 0Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N. W. 58I, 74 A. L. R. i189 (1931);
Silver v. Silver, io8 Conn. 371, 143 Atl. 240, 65 A. L. R. 943 (193o) aff'd 280 U. S.
117, 50 Sup. Ct. 57 (1931).
2 61
0RE. CODE ANN. (1930) §§ 55-1209; MICH. COMP. LAWS (1929) § 4648;
Vermont Acts 1929, No. 78; CAL. STAT. (1929) p. 1580, § I4I4 CAL. VEHICLE
AcT; N. Dak. Laws 1931 c. 184, p. 31o; IOWA CODE (1927) § 5026-bi, injury must

be due to intoxication or "reckless operation by him of such motor vehicle," see
note 263 infra; Conn. Pub. Acts 1927, c. 3o8, provides that there shall be no
recovery "unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of said
owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the
rights of others"; Neb. Laws 1931, c. 105, p. 278, which defines guest to include
"any person who accepts a ride in any motor vehicle without giving compensation
therefor, but shall not be construed to apply to or include any such passenger in a
motor vehicle being demonstrated to such passenger as a prospective purchaser."
Cf. generally (1931) 74 A. L. R. 1196; (193o) 65 A. L. R. 952; (1929) 6i A. L. R.
i
1252 at i255; (1930) 5 WASH. L. REv. 9 . See infra note 262, concerning
Kentucky statute.
262Constitutionality of statutes supra note 260 has been upheld in each case.
But Cf. Stewart v. Houk, 127 Ore. 589, 271 Pac. 893, 61 A. L. R. 1236 (1927)
holding similar Oregon statute, which deprived guest of right to recover against
owner or operator for injuries, invalid as supplying implied stipulation for nonliability in event of the host's negligence, regardless of the degree of culpability
of the host; Storla v. Spokane, P. & S. Transp. Co., 297 Pac. 367 (12 Ore. Adv. Ch.
801, i93i), rearg. den. 298 Pac. io65, held later Oregon statute, supra note 26o,
valid. And see Kentucky Acts 1930, c. 85, p. 253, which disallows any action of a
guest for injury "unless such accident shall have resulted from an intentional act
on the part of said owner or operator." It is pointed out in (1932) 20 Ky. L. . 153
that the Act is violative of the Kentucky Constitution, in that it is not only a
limitation on the right to recover for injuries, but practically destroys the right to
recover, no matter how gross the negligence of the operator or owner, unless
injury is intentionally caused. A Fayette Circuit Court case, unofficially reported
and as yet not appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, is authority for the
note-writer's statements.
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degrees in these gratuitous guest cases. 23 They further illustrate a
tendency to depart from the view that there are no degrees of negligence. While they do not directly affect the measure of or apportionment of damages where the negligences of the parties differ, they
place a liability on the owner or operator of the car only where his
active misconduct or gross negligence has caused the injury.
The courts hold, consistently with Silver v. Silver,2' that "the
Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by common law, to attain a permissible
legislative object". These statutes were held to have such an object,265
and the classification which permits the gratuitous guest to recover
only for gross negligence is held to be not arbitrary or unjustified.
Silver v. Silver states that,26 " "Such a distinction between the duty
imposed in the case of the gratuitous performance of services and
the performance of them for hire is to be found running through
many fields of the law, as for example between the gratuitous bailee
and the bailee for hire, the common carrier and the private driver,
the innkeeper and the ordinary social host. In some jurisdictions it
is held that the owner or operator of a motor vehicle is liable to a
guest only in the case of gross negligence, in analogy to the rule prevailing in the case of a gratuitous bailment of goods."' 66
213Within the meaning of the Iowa statute, "reckless" is held to mean "proceeding without heed of or concern for consequences", and not "negligence"; recklessness implies no care, coupled with disregard for consequences, Siessenger v. Puth,
239 N. W. 46 (Iowa, I931). Wagner, J., (with whom concur Stevens and Morling,
JJ.) says, at 56, "in the opinion of the writer of this dissenting opinion, recklessness necessarily includes negligence. A reckless act is necessarily a negligent act,
but a negligent act may or may not be reckless." By the majority opinion, a new
term, rcklessness, is added to the law of torts, and must be distinguished from
slight, ordinary, gross, wilful or wanton negligence. The court, attempting to
follow an imagined legislative intention concerning the meaning of the term,
forced itself to hold that "it follows that contributory negligence is not an element
to be considered or dealt with, either by pleading, proof, or instruction of the
court, in cases under this statute", (at p. 54); likewise, in the next Iowa guest
case, the court held that the guest's contributory negligence could not be considered at any stage of the case, since plaintiff's action is founded upon recklessness, and not upon negligence, Neeson v. Armstrong, 239 N. W. 56 (Iowa, 1931);
cf., in connection with the Iowa statute, Brandsoy v. Bromeland, 177 Minn. 298,
225 N. W. 162 (1929); Cerny v. Secor, 234 N. W. 193 (Iowa, 1931); Thomas v.
Disbrow, 208 Iowa, 873, 224 N. W. 36 (1929); Redfern v. Redfern, 236 N. W. 399
(Iowa 1931); Cf. Recklessness Under The Iowa Guest Statute, (1932) 17 IOWA L.
2'6 Supra note 260, 28 U. S. at 122.
REV. 268.
-65Silver v. Silver, Naudzius v. Lahr, supra note 260.
25aSupranote 26o, io8 Conn. at 379.
26OCf. note (1919) 4 A. L. R. 1196, Duty and Liability of Gratuitous Bailee or
Mandatary.
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In cases arising under these statutes, the courts have held that the
terms "gross negligence" and "willful negligence" are not so uncertain as to render the act inoperative.6 7 "The terms are familiar
in legal nomenclature and often have been defined and discussed by
the courts", says Naudzius v. Lahr.2 18 The greatest imagined difficulty was the framing of a workable definition of "gross negligence".
26 9
Storla v. Spokane, Portland & Seattle Transportation Company
says, "A brief definition I think I can say is 'great negligence'. The
term 'gross' means great or extreme. Gross negligence must include
an element of carelessness so great that the jury can say that there
was not only an absence of the due care that should have been exercised, but also a degree of negligence materially greater than that
which would constitute ordinary negligence .... Gross negligence is a
manifestly smaller amount of watchfulness and circumspection than
the circumstances require of a person of ordinary prudence". The
court quotes Krause v. Rarityi70 as follows: "In many jurisdictions
the division of negligence into degrees is not countenanced (2o R. C.
L.

2 1);

the concept being that such phrases as 'gross negligence' and

'slight negligence' are misnomers. In this state the degrees of negligence have been frequently recognized. The term 'gross negligence'
has been defined as 'the want of slight diligence', as 'an entire failure
to exercise care, or the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to
justify the belief that there was an indifference to the things and
welfare of others,' and as 'that want of care which would raise a
presumption of the conscious indifference to consequences'." The
Oregon court in the Storla case finds that it is difficult for "gross
negligence" to achieve the definiteness of meaning that "negligence"
possesses, since in the former there is no reasonable man standard,
and that if such a standard were possible as to gross negligence,
it would have to be that of a careless, thoughtless or inattentive
person. 27' It would seem, therefore, that a substantially smaller
amount of care and diligence, or conversely, a substantially greater
amount of negligence than a person of ordinary prudence would
exhibit, is in fact based upon the reasonably prudent man standard,
and would be little more difficult of application than in the case of
ordinary negligence.
267Naudzius v. Lahr, supra note

supra note

262;

Krause v. Rarity,

260;
210

Storla v. Spokane, P. & S. Transp. Co.,
Cal. 644, 293 Pac. 62 (1930); Sorrell v.

White, 153 Atl. 359 (Vt. 1931).
268Naudzius v. Lahr, supra note 26o, at 229.
2"9Supra note 262, at 369.
270Supra note 267, at 655.
'nSee supra note 263, as to 'recklessness'. For additional authority on ownerguest statutes, see Curtze, Liability in Guest-Owner Cases, (1931) 35 DIMCsNSON

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
e. The Minority Common-Law Rule in Guest Cases
The courts of several states have adopted as common law the
minority rule that requires a finding of gross negligence on the part
of an owner or operator of a vehicle in order to justify a recovery by
an injured guest.2 72 As early as 1907,273 the Massachusetts court
held274 that an invitor was liable to a gratuitous invitee to the same
extent that a gratuitous bailee is liable to his bailor, that is, only
for so-called gross negligence. This was followed in Massaletti v.
Fitzroy,2 75 in which the court said that Massachusetts still recognized
the several degrees of negligence, and concluded with the statement
that, "Justice requires that the one who undertakes to perform a
duty gratuitously should not be under the same measure of obligation
as one who enters upon the same undertaking for pay. There is an
inherent difficulty in stating the difference between the measure of
duty which is assumed in the two cases. But justice requires that,
to make out liability in case of a gratuitous undertaking, the plaintiff
ought to prove a materially greater degree of negligence than he has
to prove where the defendant is to be paid for doing the same thing.
It is a distinction which seventy-five years practice in this commonwealth has shown is not too indefinite a one to be drawn by the judge
and acted upon by the jury."275 The court repudiates the rule that
"The law furnishes no definition of gross negligence as distinguished
L. REv. 35-40; Auto-Guest Statute in California, (1930) 19 CALIF. L. REV. 336,
noting Crawford v. Foster, 63 Cal. App. Dec. 1147, 293 Pac. 841 (1930); Guest
Statute in ComparativeNegligence, (1929) 9 B. U. L. REV. 267, noting Bordonaro v.

Senk, lO9 Conn. 428, 147 Atl. 136 (1929). See also (1929) 9 B. U. L. Rav. 3i,

noting Silverv. Silver, supra note 260; (1931) i IB. U. L. REv. 87, notingEddyv.
Wells, 59 N. D. 663, 23I N. W. 785 (1930).
2I2See generally, (1922) 20 A. L. R. ioi8; (1923) 40 A. L. R. 1339; (1927) 47
A. L. R. 328; (1927) 51 A. L. R. 582; (1929) 61 A. L. R. 1254; (193o) 65 A. L. R.
952; Mechem & Mickeiwait, Gross Negligence, (193o) 5 WAsH. L. Rav. 91.
273Recognition of degrees of negligence, and that gratuitous bailee was liable to
his bailor only for gross negligence, prevailed in Massachusetts as early as 1821,
Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 121 N. E. 505, 4 A. L. R. 1187 (1919); Note
(1919) 4 A. L. R. 1196.
4

27West v. Poor, i96 Mass. x83, 81 N. E. 960, ii L. R. A. (N. S.) 936, 124 Am.
St. Rep. 541 (1907), where a milkman who found children in his milk delivery
wagon drove on without ordering them out, and plaintiff fell to the ground when
the wagon started, the court stated, "The nearest analogy that occurs to us is
that of a self-invited guest in whose presence the host acquiesces and whose
enjoyment he seeks to promote, or that of a gratuitous bailee... in order to render
the bailee liable, it must appear that he has been guilty of gross negligence."
27228 Mass. 487, I18 N. E. 168, L. R. A. 19 18C 2644, ANN. CAS. 1918B io88,
18 27N. C. C. A. 690 (1917).
6Massaletti v. Fitzroy, supra note 275 at 51o.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
from want of reasonable and ordinary care, which can be of any
practical utility,"27 ' and it discusses at length the history of degrees
of negligence in Massachusetts and in England. In Altman v. Aronson,278 in an exhaustive opinion concerning the degrees of negligence,
the Massachusetts court states:
"Expressions of dislike of the term, gross negligence, or of
inability to understand or formulate the distinction between
gross and ordinary negligence, which at various times and in
divers jurisdictions have found their way into judicial opinions,
are no longer relevant to discussions of that branch of the law as
it prevails in this commonwealth. The difficulty in stating
that distinction in cases where the evidence requires it must be
met and overcome as far as possible. Indeed, simple negligence
has sometimes been said not to be susceptible of easy definition.
But legal obligations must be marked out and explained for the
guidance of jurors, the enlightenment of the parties and the information of the public."
The court's definition, as follows, is often quoted and is consistently
upheld in Massachusetts :279
"Gross negligence is substantially and appreciably higher in
magnitude than ordinary negligence. It is materially more
want of care than constitutes simple inadvertence. -It is an act
or omission respecting legal duty of an aggravated character, as
distinguished from a mere failure to exercise ordinary care...
The element of culpability which characterizes all negligence is,
in gross negligence, magnified to a high degree as compared with
that present in ordinary negligence. Gross negligence is a manifestly smaller amount of watchfulness and circumspection than
the circumstances require of a person of ordinary prudence.
But it is something less than the wilful, wanton, and reckless
conduct which renders a defendant who has injured another
liable to the latter, even though guilty of contributory negligence, or which renders a defendant in rightful possession of
real estate liable to a trespasser whom he has injured... Ordinary and gross negligence differ in degree of inattention, while
both differ in kind from wilful and intentional conduct which is,
277

CGiI v. Middleton, lOS Mass. 477, 480 (1870).
_Supra note 273, at p. 591.
279
Gaboury v. Tisdell, 261 Mass. 147, 158 N. E. 348 (1927); Bertelli v. Tronconi,
264 Mass. 235, 162 N. E. 307 (1928); Manning v. Simpson, 261 Mass. 494, 159
N. E. 44o (1928); Baker v. Hurwitch, 265 Mass. 360, 164 N. E. 87 (1928); Forman
v. Prevoir, 266 Mass. I1, i64 N. E. 818 (1929); Bank v. Satran, 266 Mass. 253,
165 N. E. 1I7 (1929); Rog v. Eltis, 269 Mass. 466, 169 N. E. 413 (1929); Kirby v.
Keating, 271 Mass. 39 o , 171 N. E. 671 (1930); McCarron v. Bolduc, 270 Mass.
39, 169 N. E. 559 (193o); Bertera v. Cuneo, 173 N. E. 427 (Mass. 193o); Mason v.
Thomas, 174 N. E. 217 (Mass. 1931); Dzura v. Phillips, 175 N. E. 629 (Mass.
1931); Meaney v. Doyle, 177 N. E. 6 (Mass. I93i).
27
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or ought to be, known to have a tendency to injure. This definition does not possess the exactness of a mathematical demonstration, but it is what the law now affords."
0
Baron Rolfe28
was responsible for the famous and oft-quoted
statement, "I said I could see no difference between negligence and
gross negligence-that it was the same thing, with the addition of a
vituperative epithet." However, the Massaleti case traces the
history of gross negligence in bailment cases in England, and finds
that "It would seem in England the liability of a gratuitous bailee
and the liability of one who undertakes a gratuitous transportation
is the same. And to this one thing more must be added, namely:
However much the English judges have quarrelled with the meaning
of the words gross negligence, it is the fact that when pushed to a
decision the judges of England have invariably held that to make out
liability in case of a gratuitous undertaking (no matter what the
nature of the gratuitous undertaking was) gross negligence has to be

made out." 28 '

The court further states that judges in the Federal

Courts have experienced little or no difficulty in recognizing degrees
of negligence, 28 2 as in the case of gratuitous bailments.
Washington has adopted, and firmly upheld the minority rule in
guest cases. Pinckard v. Pease"" held that, in order to make the
driver liable, his negligence "must have been practically gross or
wilful". Heiman v. Klozmner 28 stated that the degree of care required of the driver is somewhere between that required where the
carriage is one for hire and that necessary to be exercised with reference to the safety of a mere trespasser. Saxe v. Terry285 deduces from
this that "it must follow that before an invited guest can recover a
showing of gross negligence is necessary." A recent article2 86 submits,
that "it may be ventured that the minority rule began its existence in
Washington due to a misapprehension of the court as to the effect
of the prior holding."
280

Later Lord Cranworth, in Wilson v. Brett, supra note 6.
8'Supra note 275 at 5o6, citing Giblin v. McMullen, L. R. 2 P. C. 317 (1868);
Moffatt v. Bateman, L. R. 3 P. C. 115 (1869); Coughlin v. Gillison, (1899) 1
2

Q.28B. 145.

2New York Cent. R. R. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 21 L. ed. 627 (1873);
Preston v. Prather, 137 U. S. 604, ii Sup. Ct. 162 (1891); Briggs v. Spaulding, 141
U. S. 132, II Sup. Ct. 924 (1891).
2131J5 Wash. 282, 197 Pac. 49 (1921).

Wash. 455, 247 Pac. 1034 (1926).
Wash. 503, 250 Pac. 27 (1926).
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Mechem & Mickelwait, Gross Negligence, (1930) 5 WASH. L.
281I39

285i4o

REV. 91,
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The Washington cases are adequately covered in the article, which terms the
minority rule the "Washington Rule." In addition, see Wold v. Gardner, 159
Wash. 665, 294 Pac. 574 (1930); Craig v. McAtee, 295 Pac. 146 (Wash. 1931).
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At one time it appeared that Pennsylvania was about to adopt the
minority rule; in Cody v. Venzie, 28 7 it was held that where the gratuitous carriage was for the sole benefit of the guest, that the owner or
operator was liable only for gross negligence, while if 'the carriage
was for the mutual benefit of both parties, host and guest, the
carrier was liable for ordinary negligence. However, later cases in
Pennsylvania 8 8 did not mention the above distinction, and it is held
& 89
in several recent cases
that the gratuitous carrier owes the duty of
exercising ordinary care for its guest, and the rule carries with it no
qualification. Maine also, at one time, looked upon the Massaletti case with favor, 29 ( although it did not adopt its terminology,
and it then appeared that Maine would apply the minority rule in
guest cases; two recent cases,291 however, impose the duty of ordinary
292
care on the owner or operator for the protection of his guest.

The Virginia court states293 that "as a matter of fact the classification of negligence into appropriate grades is too natural to be
ignored." Boggs v. Plybon 94 says, "To hold that a guest who, for
his own pleasure, is driving with his host, may recover from him for injuries suffered where there is no culpable negligence, shocks one's
sense of justice." The court cites the Massaletti case 98 with approval
and quotes from the Supreme Court of the United States as follows .29
"We have already adverted to the tendency of judicial opinion
adverse to the distinction between gross and ordinary negligence.
287263 Pa. 541, 107 Atl. 383 (1919).
288

Ferrell v. Solskie, 278 Pa. 565, 123 Atl. 493 (1924); Conroy v. Casualty Ins.
Pa. 219, i4o Atl. 905, 57 A. L. R. 463 (1928).
28Knox v. Simmerman, 3O Pa. I, 151 Atl. 678 (1930); Filer v. Filer, 3o1 Pa.
461,152 Atl. 567 (1930); Curry v. Riggles, 302 Pa. 156, 153 AtI. 325 (1930); Perry
v. 29Ryback, 302 Pa. 559, 153 Atl. 770 (1930).
Avery v. Thompson, 117 Me. 220, 2O3 Atl. 4, L. R. A. 1918D 205 (1928).
29
Trumpfeller v. Crandall, i30 Me. 282, I55 Atl. 646 (1931); Chaisson v.
Williams, 156 Atl. 154 (Me. 1932).
2
9The minority rule is criticized in Munson v. Rupker, (1926 Ind. App.),
151 N. E. ioi, aff'g 148 N. E. 169 (1926 Ind.App.); New York repudiates the
rule in Higgins v. Mason, 255 N. Y. IO4, 174 N. E. 77 (193o) noted in 31 COLUM.
L. REV. 720. Cf. Timberlake v. Cassidy, i La. App. 630 (1925); Paiewonsky v.
Joffe, iO N. J. L. 213, 129 Atl. 242,4o A. L. R. 2355 (1925); In Harber v. Graham,
2o5 N. J. L. 213, 143 Atl. 340 (1928), where the accident occurred in Massachusetts, the court applies the minority rule, although it finds no difference between
degrees of negligence, and states that there are but two kinds of negligence,
namely, ordinary and willful. Cf. Pepper v. Morrill, 24 F. (2d) 320, 57 A. L. R.
750 (C. C. A. Ist, 2928), applying the minority rule, the accident occurring in
Massachusetts.
293
Boggs v. Plybon, 16o S. E. 77 (Va. 1931) at 80.
2
295
"Supra note 293 at 81.
Supra note 275.
29
New York Cent. R. R. v. Lockwood, supra note 282 at 382.
Co., 292
9
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Strictly speaking, these expressions are indicative rather of the
degree of care and diligence which is due from a party and which
he fails to perform, than of the amount of inattention, carelessness, or stupidity which he exhibits... In each case, the negligence, whatever epithet we give it, is failure to bestow the care
and skill which the situation demands; and hence it is more
strictly accurate perhaps to call it simply 'negligence', and this
seems to be the tendency of modem authorities. If they mean
more than this, and seek to abolish the distinction of degrees of
care, skill, and diligence required in the performance of various
duties and the fulfillment of various contracts, we think they go
too far; since the requirement of different degrees of care in
different situations is too firmly settled and fixed in the law to
be ignored or changed."
Georgia also9 7 adheres firmly to the minority rule which demands a
showing of gross negligence upon which to predicate the liability of
owner or operator to his guest.
The use of the minority rule in host-guest cases, whether provided
for by legislative enactment or judicial opinion, is a step forward,
which, by demonstrating that certain refinements in dealing with
negligence are not only possible but are even desirable, tends to
lessen the historical disfavor of any judicial process which calls
for the application of comparative degrees of negligence. It thus
seems to pave the way for the adoption of a rule providing for a
proper apportionment of damage where both parties are guilty of
negligence whether of equal or unequal degree, and offers hope that
the fair, just and flexible rule of comparative negligence may ultimately overcome the almost incomprehensible prejudice against any
doctrine tending to alleviate the strict common-law views about
negligence and contributory negligence.
VI.

STATE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

In view of recent attempts in New York to induce the legislature to
enact the comparative negligence statute referred to previously in
this paper, our interest now centers upon the application by various
states of the doctrine of comparative negligence or diminution of
damages. It is often stated that at various times Kansas, Florida,
Tennessee and Georgia have applied the doctrine.29 8 To a certain
297

Epps v. Parish, 26 Ga. App. 399, io6 S. E. 297 (1921); Peavy v. Peavy, 36
202, 136 S. B. 96 (1926); Engle v. Finch, 37 Ga. App. 389, i4o S. E.632
(1927); Hall v. Slaton, 40 Ga. App. 288, 149 S. B. 306 (1929) (168 Ga. 710, 148
S. E. 741); Blanchard v. Ogletree, 41 Ga. App. 4, 152 S. E. 116 (1930); Luxembourg v. Aycock, 41 Ga. App. 722, 154 S.R. 460 (I93o); Meddin v. Karsman, 41
Ga. App. 305, 152 S. B. 6ox (1930).
29
8Cf. (1926) 12 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 113.

Ga. App.
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extent only are these statements correct. Kansas for a time considered the doctrine, but did not adopt it.

299

Florida approves the

doctrine only in cases involving injury by railroads and injury in
the employer-employee relationship, although at times the Florida
courts reveal a desire to make use of the Georgia rule. The Tennessee
holdings have been explained in a previous section,,"0 and have been
distinguished from cases applying the comparative negligence rule.
Illinois adopted and followed for a number of years what it considered to be comparative negligence, 30' only later to repudiate and
never return to it. 3
However, the Illinois doctrine was not truly
that of comparative negligence, although it separated negligence into
degrees and stated that the contributory negligence rule was too
harsh in its application and should be alleviated. The Illinois rule
was doomed from the beginning, inasmuch as it did not attempt to
apply the necessary corollary to the comparative negligence rule,
that of diminution of damages according to the amount of default of
03
the plaintiff.
As explained by the Illinois court in Galena & Chicago Union Rail34
road v. Jacobs:1
"The question of liability does not depend absolutely upon the
absence of all negligence on the part of the plaintiff, but upon
the relative degree of care or want of care, as manifested by
both parties, for all care or negligence is at best but relative, the
absence of the highest possible degree of care showing the presence
of some negligence, slight as it may be. The true doctrine,
therefore, we think, is, that in proportion to the negligence of
the defendant, should be measured the degree of care required
of the plaintiff-that is to say, the more gross the negligence
manifested by the defendant, the less degree of care will be
required of the plaintiff to enable him to recover.... We say,
then, that in this, as in all like cases, the degrees of negligence
must be measured and considered, and wherever it shall appear
that the plaintiff's negligence is comparatively slight, and that of
the defendant gross, he shall not be deprived of his action."
It will be seen that Illinois simply said that to bar a plaintiff guilty
of but slight fault was a hardship which the courts would not impose.
This doctrine is, in one sense of the term, as harsh as that of contributory negligence, inasmuch as it allows a negligent plaintiff to recover
2990p. cit. supra note 298 at 115, n. 12.
30 OSupra notes 177-181.

3

0'Supra notes 13-17.
Supra note 13; cf. supra note 158, Illinois statute applying the rule of comparative negligence in employer-employee actions for personal injuries.
:0Reference is made particularly to the rule of diminution of damages as under
the FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT; no state allows full recovery to a
304
contributorily negligent plaintiff.
Supra note 13 at 496, 7.
302
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full damages of a more guilty defendant who should be allowed to
plead plaintiff's fault in mitigation of the total damages. It was not
difficult to foresee that this anomalous Illinois doctrine would disappear from the books, unless judicial decision could be made to
reflect the respective degrees of negligence of 'the parties in the
amount of the verdict to be reached.
The Georgia rule has been discussed briefly in a preceding section
of this article. At first glance the rule appears to be that of comparative negligence, but on analysis distinctions in terminology,
although not necessarily in result, may be seen. By the Georgia
statute, °5 "if the plaintiff by ordinary care could have avoided the
consequences to himself caused by the defendant's negligence, he is
not entitled to recover. But in other cases the defendant is not
relieved, although the plaintiff may in some way have contributed
to the injury sustained." The terms 'ordinary care' and 'comparative
negligence' immediately suggest an irreconcilable conflict, but the
courts have, to a certain extent, overcome this apparent conflict,
although the cases reveal some confusion regarding the correct name
to be given to the Georgia rule.35
Jenkins, P. J., says,"0 7 "the term 'contributory' negligence has
been construed by the courts as synonymous with what is perhaps
more accurately termed 'comparative negligence', or the rule of
diminution of damages, where the plaintiff's negligence is not such as
to wholly bar a recovery"; Cobb, J., says30 8 that the rule which
requires one to exercise ordinary care and diligence to avoid the
consequences of another's negligence necessarily applies to a case
where there is an opportunity of exercising this diligence after the
negligence of the defendant has begun and has become apparent,
3 GA. ANN. CODE (Parks, 1914) § 4426; cf.ibid. §§ 4424,4425, 3471, 3472, 3473,
2781, 2782, 2783.

3

0Note that in 1859, McDonald, J., said, in Macon & W. R. R. v. Davis, 27 Ga.
113, that "one member of the court is of opinion that the presiding Judge ought
to have instructed the jury that, in the event they should find that both parties
were at fault, but that of the defendant was greatest, the quantum of fault of the
plaintiff must be weighed and the damages should be abated accordingly. We
know of no rule for graduating the damages in that way... It might so happen,
in a case of mutual negligence, that the jury could not determine the preponderance of the blame, and that some authorities say that in such case, there being no
mode of apportioning damages at law, there can be no recovery. But if the parties
are not equally in the wrong, how can the damages be apportioned? It would be
difficult to set off negligence against negligence and apportion the damage. He
who is guilty of the greater negligence or wrong, must be considered the original
aggressor and accountable accordingly."
30
Lamon v. Perry, 33 Ga. App. 248, 252, 125 S. E. 907 (1924).
308
Western & Atl. R. R. Co. v. Ferguson, supra note 255.
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or the circumstances are such that an ordinarily prudent person
would have reason to apprehend its existence,0 9 and that310 "in such
cases and in such cases only does the failure to exercise ordinary care
to escape the consequences of negligence entirely defeat a recovery.
In other cases, that is, where the person injured by the negligence of
another is at fault himself, in that he did not, before the negligence
of the other became apparent, or before the time arrived when as an
ordinarily prudent person it should have appeared to him that there
was reason to apprehend its existence, observe that amount of care
and diligence which would be exercised under like circumstances by
an ordinarily prudent person, such fault or failure to exercise due care
and diligence at such a time would not entirely preclude a recovery,
but would authorize the jury to diminish the damages in proportion to
the amount of default attributable to the person injured."
The position of Georgia upon the issue of contributory negligence
was clarified in 19o8 by Lumpkin, J., who stated :P
"Confusion sometimes arises from the use of the expression
'contributory negligence'. In most jurisdictions contributory
negligence is used as referring to such negligence on the part of
the plaintiff, contributing to causing the injury to himself, as
will prevent a recovery by him. In this State we have a doctrine,
which is sometimes called that of comparative negligence, under
which, if the plaintiff is not without fault, but his negligence
does not amount to such a failure to use ordinary care which
will prevent a recovery,1 2 he may recover damages of the de30'In re the Georgia rule, Brandsoy v. Bromeland, 177 Minn. 298, 225 N. W
supra note 263, states, "the law will not permit one in possession of
his faculties to shut his eyes or benumb his faculties and in the absence of distracting circumstances fail to see or ascertain danger which is plainly visible or ascertainable, and then to successfully assert that the danger was not apparent or
obvious", quoted approvingly in Siessenger v. Puth, supra note 263 at 55, and
further citing Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, 139 At. 698 (1927).
3
lOSupra note 255 at 711.
"'Savannah Elec. Co. v. Crawford, 13o Ga. 42i, 424, 6o S. E. io56 (19o8).
31rThe extreme legnths to which the Georgia courts will go to find for a negligent
plaintiff are shown by Louisville & N. R. v. Stafford, 146 Ga. 2o6, 91 S. E. 29
(1916); at 209, Atkinson, J., says, "the railroad might be negligent per se in violating the statute in regard to running trains over public crossings, and the plaintiff
might be negligent per se in violating the statute in regard to running automobiles'while approaching and crossing railroad tracks; but it would not necessarily
follow that the negligence of the plaintiff would be the proximate cause of the
injury or that it would be as great as that of the defendant, or that the plaintiff
by the exercise of ordinary care could have avoided the consequences of the
defendant's negligence after it had commenced or become apparent, or the circumstances would have afforded reason to apprehend-its existence. The question
of negligence and the degree of negligence of the respective parties would be for
162 (1929),
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fendant, in a proper case, but the amount of his recovery will
be reduced in proportion to the amount of default attributable
to him. In this sense the term 'contributory negligence' will
generally be found to have been used in Georgia, rather than
in the sense of negligence which will prevent a recovery."313
It is submitted that although the Georgia rule in terms requires the
plaintiff to exercise ordinary care to avoid the consequences of the defendant's negligence, this prerequisite is so limited and qualified by
judicial decision that Georgia cases approximate the result obtainable
under the rule of comparative negligence.
In 1913 Nebraska adopted a comparative negligence statute314
which provided that in all personal injury actions "the fact that
the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall
not bar a recovery when the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
was slight and the negligence of the defendant was gross in comparison, btit the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall be
considered by the jury in the mitigation of damages in proportion to
the amount of the contributory negligence attributable to the plaintiff." In construing this statute, Morrison v. Scotts Bluff Count 15
held that, "the true rule is that, if the plaintiff is guilty of negligence
directly contributing to the injury, he cannot recover, even though
the defendant was negligent, unless the contributory negligence of
plaintiff was slight, and the negligence of defendant gross in comparison therewith. If, in comparing the negligence of the parties, the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff is found to exceed in any
degree that which under the circumstances amounts to slight neglithe jury under the particular facts." On affirnance for plaintiff, Beck, J., dissenting, says at 210, "the plaintiff was violating a criminal statute at the time
of the injury received by him, and his violation of the statute was the efficient
cause of his injury. The great weight of authority is against his right to recover
under this state of facts, although the defendant may have been guilty of violating
the statute in reference to railroads." Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Parrish, 4o Ga. App.
814, 151 S. E. 541 (1930).
3 t3
Lumpkin, J., later said, in Elk Cotton Mills v. Grant, I4O Ga. 727, 731, 79
S. E. 836, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 656 (1913), that "As has been more than once
noticed in opinions of this court, the words 'contributory negligence' are generally
employed to express a degree of negligence which will preclude a recovery. In
this State, unfortunately perhaps, those words are commonly used to express
negligence which will diminish, but not defeat, a recovery, under the doctrine
of comparative negligence, which is recognized here. But if the injured person
causes the injury by his own negligence, or if the plaintiff by the use of ordinary
care could have avoided the consequences to himself caused by the defendant's
negligence, he is not entitled to recover."
314
NEB. CoMe. STAT. 1922, § 8834 (REv. STAT. 1913, § 7892).
315104 Neb. 254, 256, 177 N. W. 158 (1920).
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gence, or if the negligence of defendant falls in any degree short of
gross negligence under the circumstances, then the contributory
negligence of plaintiff, however slight, will defeat a recovery. And
even when plaintiff has established his right to recover under this rule,
it is the duty of the jury to deduct, from the amount of damage
sustained, such amount as his contributory negligence, if any, bears
to the whole amount of damage sustained." Of course, sole negligence, 316 as well as negligence more than slight,317 on the part of
plaintiff proximately contributing to the injury will bar recovery;
if plaintiff's testimony reveals negligence more than slight upon his
part, the court may enter a judgment of dismissal or direct a verdict
for the defendant. 31 8
It may be asserted that the results obtained in personal injury
actions in other states differ little from those obtained under the
Nebraska doctrine, inasmuch as a jury probably discounts plaintiff's
slight default in its findings. However, it must be remembered that
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, however slight, is always
a theoretical bar to his recovery, and in those jurisdictions in which
the majority rule of contributory negligence obtains, the jury is so
instructed.
Recent Nebraska cases point to the conclusion that the courts
are at times more lenient in application of the Nebraska doctrine 19
31
6Dodds v. Omaha St. Ry., 104 Neb. 692, 178 N. W. 258 (1920); Tysodi v.
Mo. P. l.. Corp., 113 Neb. 504,203 N. W. 560 (1925); Rogers v. Chicago, iR.
I. &P.
Ry., 39 F. (2d) 6o1 (193o).
317
Rogers v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., supra note 316; Eggeling v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry., xig Neb. 229, 235, 228 N. W. 361, (1929), stating, "Eggeling's
duty of self-protection was not lessened by reason of any excessive speed (of
defendant). His obligation to stop, look and listen, when any of these or all
would have proved beneficial, remained the same although the speed was excessive. Failure to do so is negligence more than slight, in comparison with that of
the defendant, and will defeat a recovery, even though the whistle was not blown
and the bell not rung, or the speed may have been excessive." (Italics the court's.)
318
Tyson v. Mo. P. P. Corp., supra note 316; Dodds v. Omaha St. Ry., supra
note 316; Lieb. v. Omaha & C. B. Ry., ii9 Neb. 222, 228 N. W. 364 (1929).
319
Kelso v. Seward County, 117 Neb. i36, 219 N. W. 843 (1928) where plaintiff
car driver plunged into an unlit and unprotected excavation in a public highway
at night; the trial court's charge failed to stress the proposition that if the negligence of the defendant fell short in any degree of gross negligence, then plaintiff
could not recover. Despite this, verdict for plaintiff affirmed on appeal. Cf.
Giles v. Welsh, 239 N. W.'813 (Neb. 1932), in which defendant's employee left
his stalled truck after nightfall for several hours without lights and with no guard
to warn oncoming cars of danger. Defendants claimed negligence more than
slight on plaintiff's part in having been unable to stop his car within the range of
his lights and in having failed to keep a proper lookout for his own safety. The
trial court held for plaintiff; affirmed on appeal. Cf. Folken v. Union Pac. P.. R.
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than the wording of the comparative negligence statute in that
jurisdiction would suggest. An interesting example is Emil v. Standard Oil Company. 20 Defendant's employee invited a child to ride
with him and help him distribute gas and oil on the regular route;
as the child attempted to enter defendant's truck, the employee
suddenly started the truck and swerved it away from the child, with
the result that the latter fell under the truck and died from injuries
sustained. The trial court charged in part,"2 ' "If you find that both
were negligent, then it is your duty to fix the degree of the deceased's
negligence as compared with that of the defendant. If you find
from the evidence that each was guilty of an equal degree of negligence, or that the negligence of the deceased was greater than that of
the defendant, then you should in either event return a verdict
for the defendant." Obviously under such an instruction the jury
would be justified in concluding that if the negligence of deceased
did not equal or exceed that of defendant, then the plaintiff would be
entitled to recover. Also, no mention was made in the charge concerning the "slight-gross" wording of the statute or the rule laid
down in the Morrison case, yet the appellate court held that the instruction was not reversible error, although it was criticized as being a
less full and accurate statement of the law of comparative negligence
than might be desired,3 2 and the appellate court advised trial courts
in the future to use the rule laid down in the Morrisoncase.
3
Wisconsin, in 1931, passed a comparative negligence statute 2
applying to all actions "to recover damages for negligence resulting
in death or injury to person or property", and providing that contributory negligence shall not bar recovery "if such negligence was
not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is
sought." 32 Although valuable suggestions as to proper application
N. W. 831 (Neb. 1931); Stevens v. Luther, 105 Neb. 184, i8o N. W. 87 (1920);
Robinson v. Troy Laundry, IO5 Neb. 267, i8o N. W. 43 (1920); McCarthy v.
Ravenna, 99 Neb. 674, 157 N. W. 629 (1916). 2
320117 Neb. 418, 22o N. W. 685 (1928).
1 tSupra at 421, 2 and 687.
mHowever, on appeal in the Emil case, no actionable negligence was found
against defendant, and, as the appellate court said that negligence will never be
presumed, but must be proved, it follows that a verdict should have been directed
for defendant.
-mWis. Laws 1931, C.242 (WIs. STATS. § 331.045); see supranote 164.
2Wis. Laws 1907, C. 254, amending Wis. STATS. 1898, § 1816 (5), provided that
a railroad should be liable for injuries if caused in whole or in the greater part by
negligence of its employees, and further provided that "in all cases under this act,
the question of negligence and contributory negligence shall be for the jury."
Statute construed as constitutional in Kiley v. Chic., M. & St. P. Ry., 138 Wis.
215, 1"9 N. W. 309 (i909); cf. Klein v. Valerius, 87 Wis. 54, 57 N. W. 112, 22
239
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and administration of the comparative negligence statute have
recently appeared, 35 as yet no cases have arisen under the Wisconsin Act"' which became effective June 17, 1931.
Mississippi has been more successful than any other state in its
application of the doctrine of comparative negligence. In 191o,
the Mississippi legislature passed an Act 32 7 which stated that in all

personal injury or death or property damage actions, contributory
negligence "shall not bar a recovery, but damages shall be diminished
by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable
to the person injured, or the owner of the property, or the person
having control over the property." This Act is nearly identical with
the bill proposed in New York during the past year. The next
succeeding section2 8 of the Mississippi Code prescribes that all
questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be for the
jury to determine, but the courts have qualified this latter section by
holding that there must be a conflict of testimony 39 or an actual
issue concerning negligence or contributory negligence in order that
such questions be submitted to the jury.no Also, the court may
charge as a matter of law that plaintiff's negligence proximately
contributed to his injury,33' and must then instruct on the comparative negligence doctrine.
L. R. A. 609 (1894). See Natchez & S. R. R. v. Crawford, 99 Miss. 697, 55 So.
597 ('9"1).
32BTLL. STATE BAR ASS'N WISCONSIN, vol. IV, No. 4, 232-236; (1931) 16
MARQ. L. REv. 3.
32'Tomasik v. Lauferman, 238 N. W. 847 (Wis. 1931). Here plaintiff alleged
both ordinary negligence and gross negligence. Trial court submitted both
degrees of negligence to the jury, instructing that if gross negligence were found,
the jury need not consider the questions relating to ordinary negligence. Held,
defendant's drunken driving constituted gross negligence, thus plaintiff's negligence, if any, was immaterial. The jury gave a verdict for plaintiff of $25,250,
which was subsequently reduced to $i5,ooo. (Injury occurred Dec. 9, 1930,
judgment entered April I, 1931, statute not taking effect until June 17, 1931).
17Miss. ANN CODE (Hemingway, I93O) § 511.
32
81bid.,
329

§ 512.

McColluM v. Thrift, 156 Miss. 376, 125 So. 544 (1930).
33
Natchez & S. R. R. v. Crawford, 99 Miss. 697, 55 So. 597 (in);

see supra

note
324 and infra note 332.
33 1
-Hudson v. L. & N. R. R., 3o F. (2d) 391 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929); see Yazoo & M.
V. R. R. v. Williams, 114 Miss. 236, 74 So. 835 (1917), where plaintiff was guilty
of gross negligence in attempting to cross railroad track, but jury awarded him
$io,ooo damages; on appeal, the court held that even if plaintiff had been guilty
of no negligence, he would have been entitled to no more than $io,ooo or $12,000,
and where, as here, it is obvious that the jury failed to diminish plaintiff's damages
according to his negligence, the court may either order a remittitur and affirm, or
will reverse and remand the case. Remittitur of $5,ooo ordered.
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By judicial construction of the Mississippi statute,"2 the contributory negligence of plaintiff, whether slight, ordinary or gross,

will not bar a recovery,"' although it is stated 3 that "this statute
does not deal with, and was not intended to introduce into our juris-

prudence, degrees of contributory negligence, but it deals with
contributory negligence proper of every character."

Plaintiff's sole

negligence will of course bar his right to Tecovery, 315 but his gross
contributory negligence results only in a diminution of the damages
by the jury in proportion to his default."' Defendant must be shown
3 2

1 Natchez & S. R. Co. v. Crawford, supra note 330, at 718, 719, states that,
"there is no merit whatever in the contention that it violates either the due process
or the equal protection clauses of the Constitution of the United States. It is
clearly within the police power of the state. The statute makes a classification
of all actions for personal injuries. This classification is based on reason and
justice, and is not a discrimination in favor of defendants in other character of
actions." Cf. Jones v. A. & V. Ry., 72 Miss. 22, 16 So. 379 (1894), construing
similar special statutes in Mississippi, cited supra notes 210-213.
remiss. Cent. Ry. v. Robinson, io6 Miss. 896, 64 So. 838 (r914); Ill.
Cent. Ry.
v. Thomas, 109 Miss. 536, 68 So. 773 (1915); Snyder v. Campbell, 145 Miss. 287,
iio So. 678 (1926); St. L.-S. F. Ry. v. Thompson, 30 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 5th
1929); Frazier v. Hull, 157 Miss. 303, 127 So. 775 (i93O); St. L.-S. F. Ry. v.
Nichols, 138 So. 364 (Miss. 193). See Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cosnahan,
io5 Miss. 615, 62 So. 824 (1913).
334
Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Carroll, io3 Miss. 83o, 835, 60 So. 1013 (1913);
the court further states, "this statute is plain, unambiguous, and easily construed. Prior to its passage contributory negligence-any contributory negligence, slight, ordinary, or gross, if negligence can in fact be so classified-barred a
recovery, and the manifest legislative purpose of enacting it was simply to alter
the rule on this subject, which had been established by the courts, so that such
negligence should not thereafter bar recovery, but should simply cause a diminution of the amount thereof."
3 5
McWhorter v. Draughn, 134 Miss. 247, 98 So. 597 (1924), where it is held
that the test as to whether recovery can be had is whether defendant was guilty
of any substantial negligence which proximately caused the injury; and see
Columbus & G. Ry. v. Buford, I5o Miss. 832, ii6 So. 817 (1928), which holds
that negligence which may be imputed to plaintiff is a defense pro tanto.
36Friedman v. Allen, 152 Miss. 377, I18 So. 828 (1928); Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v.
Williams, supra note 331; Chapman v. Powers, 15o Miss. 687, 1I6 So. 6o9 (1928).
In the Chapman case, plaintiff was riding with her husband, who was driving
while drunk, when their car hit defendant's unlit gravel pile. Plaintiff appealed
from a $5oo verdict, as being so grossly inadequate as to manifest passion or
prejudice on the part of the jury. The appellate court stated, at 694, "A large part
of the negligence proximately contributing to appellant's injuries was her own
negligence in riding in a car, between eleven and twelve at night, driven by her
husband, who was in such a drunken condition as to render him unfit to drive the
car with reasonable care and skill." The court affiried the $5oo verdict for plaintiff. Cf. Byrnes v. City of Jackson, I4O Miss. 656, io5 So. 861 (r925), in which
plaintiff was clawed by a bear which she attempted to feed in a city-owned zoo.
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to be guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to cause
plaintiff's injury or damage.s 7 The duty of the jury to diminish
damages in proportion to the default of plaintiff is mandatory, 3 8
and where it is manifest that the jury has failed to consider plaintiff's
default, the court will not permit the verdict to stand.339 Although
each party alleges sole negligence of the other party as the cause of the
injury complained of, such pleadings do not prevent the trial court
from instructing on the doctrine of comparative negligence. 0 It is
also held that, although the pleadings do not set up the statute, and
no instructions on the doctrine of comparative negligence were requested by either party, the court may instruct on the doctrine.u'
In the event that the court does not, the jury may apply the rule of
comparative negligence, in the absence of directions to the contrary, for
the Mississippi court endowsits jurieswith a knowledge of thelaw.u
The comparative negligence statute has been applied in Mississippi
satisfactorily for over a score of years; courts, juries, counsel and
litigants appear satisfied with its operation and administration,
and it is obvious that it approaches more closely the ideals of theoretical and practical justice than the harsh and inflexible rule of
contributory negligence which assumes that the total burden, financially and physically, must lie upon the injured party who has been
slightly negligent,343 and that there can no more be an apportioning
The bear's keeper had left it in the open park, on a ten or twelve foot chain.
Defendant demurred and pleaded plaintiff's sole negligence. The trial court
sustained the demurrer. The court on appeal applied the New York rule making
it the duty of the city to exercise reasonable care to make its parks safe, and held
that the case should go to the jury under the statute of comparative negligence.
n7McWhorter v. Draughn, supranote 335.
338
Tendall v. Davis, 129 Miss. 30, 91 So. 701 (1922).
3Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Williams, supra note 331; Seifferman v. Leach, 138

So. 563 (Miss.

1932).

0Morrell Packing Co. v. Branning, 155 Miss. 376, 124 So. 356 (1929); Tendall
v. Davis, supra note 338.
3
uGoodman v, Lang, i58 Miss. 204, 330 So. 311 (1930).
3 42
Supra at 2o8, "While it is true that no instruction or pleading was made
setting up contributory negligence, still the jury is presumed to have a knowledge
of law, and, in the present case, must have acted upon it."
'4See Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 154 Miss. 475, 322 So. 735 (1929), where
defendant's servant overflowed plaintiff's gasoline tank; plaintiff pointed out
the danger of injury to the attendant, but the latter refused to do anything about
it. Plaintiff's car burst into flames after he drove about i6o feet from the station,
personal injury and property damage resulting. Defendant conceded that it was
negligence on the part of the attendant to overflow the tank, but claimed that
plaintiff's negligence in driving the car was the proximate cause of his injury and
furthermore, that plaintiff assumed the risk by driving the car. Held, defendant
should have reasonably foreseen that the overflow might have become ignited in
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of the damages than there can be an apportionment of negligences of
the respective parties.
VII.

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN NEW YoRK

It was pointed out in the first section of this paper that an Act was
submitted recently to the New York Assembly'" whereby the Civil
Practice Act would have been amended to allow an action for damages
for personal injury or property damage despite contributory negligence, such contributory negligence to be considered by the jury
only in diminution of damages. The proposed Act follows closely
the wording of both the Federal Employers' Liability Acts" and the
Mississippi Comparative Negligence statute,U6 which we have discussed at length.
Many problems arise concerning the desirability of enacting this
proposed Act. To consider the problems in order briefly, since limitations of space forbid too involved or lengthy a discussion:
I. Is There any Real Need for ComparativeNegligence in New York?
It may be said that there is always need for law which metes out
justice.U7 When a specific legal doctrine is shown to be outmoded 8
some manner, resulting in injury to plaintiff. This being true, defendant's negligence was a proximate cause, and the doctrine of assumption of risk has no application.
344
The Act was introduced by Mr. Foody, read once in Assembly and referred
to the Committee on Codes, wherein it was killed. In February, 1932, the
Rochester Bar Association Legislative Committee reported favorably on the Act
but deferred definite action in order to ascertain views of attorneys on the bill.
345
Fourteen legislatures have enacted acts identical to the Federal Act; seven
states have Acts similar, while other states have acts which produce the same
effects. Supra notes i57-i6O. Mention of the FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY
ACT in this section of this paper signifies the comparative negligence portion of
that act (45 U. S. C. § 53), and such mention is meant to include similar or identical state legislation. See supra notes Ix5-i6.
346Supra note 327.
347
Duff, J., in Grand Trunk Pac. R. R. v. Earl, (1923) 2 D. L. R. 741, 742,
(1923) Can. L. Rep. 397, says, "This is one of those cases that sometimes cause
one to turn a rather wistful eye to jurisdictions in which where injury results
from the combined negligence or misconduct of the plaintiff and the defendant,
the burden of the loss can be equitably distributed." Did, Mignault, J., at 751,
"If I may say so, the doctrine of the civil law, in force in the Province of Quebec
and also adopted in admiralty matters, is much more equitable, for where there
is common fault, the liability of each party is measured by his degree of culpability. This prevents the negligent defendant from entirely escaping punishment,
because the plaintiff, in a greater or less degree, has contributed by his negligence
to the accident. However, this is a matter for the consideration of the lawmaker, for the courts are obliged to apply the law however harsh it may seem."
Cf. opinion of Anglin, J., in the instant case.
318The authors acknowledge indebtedness to J. A. Padway, member of Wis-
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and defective, and to act unjustly in many cases,3 9 and when it
appears that the rule has been changed in several allied fields in the
furtherance of justice, it is high time to consider whether a change
from the old and arbitrary rule is desirable in all, rather than in a few,
fields of litigation. When, as in the case of the doctrine of contributory negligence an adequate substitute has been found in the rule
of comparative negligence, when it appears that this rule has been
effective in each of the fields in which it has been applied; when it is
realized that the damages awarded under the proposed rule provide a
more exact and satisfactory remedy, the least that can be said is
that a prima facie case in favor of the substitute rule has been made
out.
2.

Does the Rule of ContributoryNegligence Operate as a Real
Deterrent?

It is clear that it does not. The primary reason upon which the
rule was supposed to rest has clearly failed, and it is no longer possible
to claim that it, by being a bitter punishment, truly acts as a restraint
upon negligent conduct. The vast number of negligence cases to be
found in every jurisdiction entirely negatives its effectiveness as a
deterrent. Granting that the rule of contributory negligence may
consin Bar, formerly Judge of Civil Court and member of the 1925 Wisconsin
legislature, who has been most influential in gaining legislative sanction of comparative negligence in his state; Mr. Padway writes, in (1931) 16 MARQ. L. REV.
1, 4, "The writer has devoted much of his professional career to the law of negligence. Many years ago he became convinced of the injustice of the application
of the contributory negligence rule whereby one guilty of ordinary negligence,
however slight, is defeated in his claim against another guilty of ordinary negligence, however great. The rule may have been less unjust before the advent
of machinery, when negligence and contributory negligence involved simple acts.
The negligence of the parties was on a more equal basis, but since the advent of
machinery, when human beings are pitted against complex machines driven by
steam, electricity, etc., the disparity is too great to test these comparative acts by
the old rule."
349Ibid. at 4, quoting 2 BLASHFIELD, CYc.AuTo LAw, (1927) 1008, on contributory negligence, "In some of its aspects it offends every instinct of good sportsmanship.... the doctrine has been uncertain and unsatisfactory, and not infrequently has been productive of serious injustice. Like the defense of alibi in
criminal cases, the defense of contributory negligence is frequently set up merely
to raise a cloud of dust under cover of which to escape the penalty for a grave
error.... The doctrine of comparative negligence which at one time was almost
obsolete, has been restored to favor in many jurisdictions.... There areparticular reasons for modifying the doctrine in its application to the relation of
motorist and pedestrian.... The scales will hang more evenly between these two
classes of travelers if the doctrine of contributory negligence, if not entirely
abolished, shall be restricted in its application to the pedestrian."
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350
have acted as a deterrent at the time of Butterfield v. Forrester,
5
experience under the changed conditions ' of a machine age seems to
demonstrate that belief that the rule of contributory negligence thus
acts is based on pure imagination.
The contributory negligence doctrine does nothing more than bar
recovery by an injured and negligent plaintiff. The negligent defendant is usually guilty of the greater negligence proximately causing
the injury, and is thus the party against whom the deterrent must
operate if it is to be truly effective. As long as we allow a concededly
negligent defendant, who is mainly responsible for the injury, entirely
to escape the consequences of his negligent conduct we are hardly
in a position to assert that the rule of contributory negligence acts
as a satisfactory deterrent against commission of negligent torts.

3. Is the ProposedLaw an Exception to the Rules of Negligence which
may Prove Disadvantageousto Courts and Claimants?
Successful application of the doctrine of comparative negligence
in the several special fields, as in admiralty, workmen's compensation
acts, employers' liability acts and in automobile guest cases, reveals
the practicability of this change in the rules of negligence. It has
been shown conclusively that courts and claimants and their counsel
have experienced no difficulty with the doctrine of comparative
negligence or its application. Judging from the practical experience
of admiralty courts, state and federal courts applying the Federal
Employers' Liability Act," 2 or courts applying special statutes dealing
with comparative negligence, there are no hidden pitfalls in the
doctrine into which courts may fall, other than certain ever-present
problems in connection with proper instructions by trial courts
covering the mode of division or apportionment of damages. 3s After
the first decision outlining the proper method of apportionment,
and giving a careful judicial construction of a comparative negligence
statute, this difficulty should disappear. The experience already
in hand leaves no ground for any claim that lawyers or clients do not
25011 East 60 (I8O9). The entire doctrine of contributory negligence dates
from this case; see Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, (1908) 21 HARV. L. REV. 233,
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1924) 469.
351

See supra note 348. Arguments used in favor of adoption of workmen's
compensation acts are applicable also in favor of the extension of comparative
negligence in other fields. See the statement of policy behind workmen's compensation acts contained in IDAHO CoMP. STAT. (1919) § 6214, supra note 141.
3

nSupranotes 345, 116, 117.
MEmil v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 320, illustrates this possible difficulty;

3

the appellate court pointed out correct wording or trial court instructions.
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know or cannot easily ascertain their rights under the doctrine of
comparative negligence. Justice Marshall in a Wisconsin case a
sounds the only caveat when he says, "The comparative negligence
law should be administered in its spirit, rather than in its letter,
otherwise what was intended to be a beneficial change in our system
might prove to be the very reverse."
4. Have New York Courts had any Experiencefrom which we may
Judge Whether the Results Obtainable under Comparative
Negligence are Desirable?
A number of New York cases have applied the comparative negligence rule under special statutes. In Hendricks v. New York, New
35
Haven &' Hartford Railroad,
plaintiff was employed by defendant
railroad in interstate commerce. Defendant gave plaintiff free
transportation to the station nearest his home, and plaintiff occupied
the last seat in a rear car of the train. The car stopped on a trestle
some distance from the station, which was ahead and separated from
plaintiff's car by two main tracks. Plaintiff thought the train would
start again before he could make his exit from the front of the car,
and so attempted to leave by the rear, but found his way blocked by
a girder. However, he descended to the planks of the trestle and fell
through to the street below when the planks gave way. The trial
court apportioned damages. The Appellate Division held that"'
"the submission of the question of liability on the theory of proportionate negligence under the [Federal] Employers' Liability Act
was error, since the means pursued by plaintiff constituted a deviation
from the employment and pursuit of plaintiff's own private desires
and concerns, to enable him to make use of a shortcut or exit not provided for that purpose," in other words that this deviation took him
beyond the scope of his employment. The Court of Appeals reversed,
stating that defendant was under a duty to provide reasonable
means of exit, that plaintiff's conduct under the circumstances was
reasonable, and that35'7 "he is entitled under this statute, whether
negligent or otherwise, to recover in some amount by way of apportionment of damages, unless his means of exit constitutes a deviation from his employment." The Court specifically stated that this
58
was not a deviation from employment.
3

Schendel v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., supra note 348, dissenting opinion, at 451.
3'251 N. Y. 297, 167 N. E. 449, rev'g 225 App. Div. 687, cert. den. 28o U. S.
6oi, 5o Sup. Ct. 82 (1929).
35
Supra note
35

355, 225 App. Div. 687; Kapper and Hagarty, Jj., dissent.
7Supranote 355 at 300, per O'Brien, J.
35
sCardozo, Lehman, JJ., dissent.
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In Rocco v. Lehigh Valley Railroad, 19 plaintiff's testator was a
track inspector of defendant railroad. While making an inspection,
having failed to comply with an oral company rule that inspectors
should ascertain the positions of trains on the tracks before making
inspections, plaintiff's testator was fatally injured by defendant's
train, which failed to sound its whistle in approaching the curve at
which the accident took place, and which was three and a half hours
late due to landslides on the road. The jury found that concurring
negligence of deceased and the engineer of the train caused the injury,
and without difficulty rendered its verdict on the theory of comparative negligence. This was affirmed on appeal. 60
The outstanding case of comparative negligence in New York is
Fitzpatrickv. InternationalRailway;'" plaintiff was injured in Ontario,
Canada, while in the employ of defendant railway, a New York
corporation. Suing in New York, plaintiff claimed the benefit of
the 'Ontario Contributory Negligence Act', 6 ' which permits a negligent plaintiff to recover against a defendant who is guilty of a greater
degree of negligence, and provides that if it is impracticable to determine the respective degrees of fault, the defendant shall be liable
for one-half of the damages sustained. 63 Under this statute, the
burden of proving contributory negligence is placed upon the defendant. 4 Under the New York rule, contributory negligence would
have barred recovery, and the burden would have been on plaintiff
to prove freedom from contributory negligence. The trial court
charged in accordance with the Ontario statute that the burden of
proving contributory negligence was upon the defendant and that
damages might be apportioned in proportion to plaintiff's default;
319
2 39 N. Y. Supp. I57, aff'd 248 N. Y. Supp. 15, 231 App. Div. 323 (1931).
36
OVan Kirk and Davis, JJ., dissenting, latter stating at 326, "disobedience of a
safety rule is something more than contributory negligence. It may constitute
generally, as I think it did in this case, a primary cause of the accident..
The burden of responsibility may not so easily be shifted to another by saying
that the engineer should have given a whistle signal before rounding the curve,
and, therefore, comparison may be made between negligent acts." The majority
of the court attempts to distinguish Unadilla Valley R. R. v. Caldine, 277 U. S.
578, 48 Sup. Ct. 433 (1928) (supra note 120) on ground that there the company
order was printed rather than oral.
361252 N. Y. 127, 169 N. E. 112 (1929), 68 A. L. R. 8oi, noted at 8o9 and (i92)
39 YALE L. J. 9oi; (1929) 43 HARV. L. REv. 1134.
362Ontario Laws 1924, c. 32.
36See Sapone v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R., 130 Misc. 755, 225 N. Y. Supp. 2ix
(Sup. Ct. 1927) citing and quoting at length from Montreal Tramways Co. vr.
McAllister, 51 D. L. R. 429 (1920); id, 26 Que. Off. L. Rep. 174'(916), best
authority on Canadian comparative negligence.
3
"Supranote 344, § 4.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
the jury found plaintiff guilty of io% of the total negligence and
judgment was rendered for him for go% of the loss.365
Judge Crane, speaking for a unanimous court, says,36 "While
it is true that in this State we speak of the proof of freedom from
contributory negligence as being a burden of proof resting upon the
plaintiff, it is, in reality, even here, more than a mere burden of
proof, it is a substantive part of the plaintiff's right to recover...
As we have said, the Ontario Act goes beyond a matter of procedure
and gives a right unknown to the common law, the right of an injured
person to recover for another's negligence, even though contributing
by his own neglect to bring it about. For these reasons the trial court
was quite correct in charging the jury in accordance with the Ontario
statute36
P 7... If we are to adopt a part (of the Ontario statute) we
must apply it as a whole, because it affects the substantial rights of
the parties. Under our rule, it would be impossible for the plaintiff
to prove his own contributing neglect, without proving himself out
of court, as we have no comparative negligence rule for actions at
common law."36 8
The question of New York's experience with comparative negligence is clearly and concisely answered by Justice Crane in the Fitzpatrick case as follows .69
"Furthermore, the courts of this State are not unaccustomed
to the application of the law of contributory negligence adopted
by the Ontario act. We have a similar provision under Section
3 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 37 0 Although the
3
5The authors submit that the finding of direct percentages of negligence is unusual in administration of statutes dealing with comparative negligence or under the
English admiralty rule of apportionment. However, it is obvious that substantial
justice may be done, as in the present case, where the jury finds the plaintiff guilty
of one-tenth of the total negligence and thus reduces plaintiff's damage by onetenth. Cf. supra note 348 at 12, 14; Kalashian v. Hines, 71 Wis. 429, 177 N. W.
602 (192o), where jury found plaintiff's negligence contributed to the extent of
forty percent to his injury as compared to the total negligence of both plaintiff
and defendant, and sixty percent of the damages was allowed to plaintiff; Richter
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 176 Wis. 188, 186 N. W. 616 (1921).
366Supra note 361 at 133.
3671bid. at 135.
36
In Sapone v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R., supra note 361, where injury occurred
in Quebec, and the administrator sues in New York, suit was barred because
Quebec law allows only the consort and ascendant and descendant relatives to
sue for wrongful death. An apparent limitation is placed upon the Fitzpatrick
case by Wikoff v. Hirschel, 258 N. Y. 28, 179 N. E. 249 (1932), which holds that a
cause of action for wrongful death given by a foreign (New Jersey) statute is
enforceable in New York unless against public policy or unless remedies prescribed
3 69
cannot be adapted to New York procedure.
Supra note 361 at 135-r36.
370
Citing it as Act of April 22, igo8, 35 STAT. AT LARGE 66, c. 149.
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acts of Congress form part of the laws of the State of New
York , unlike the laws of Ontario, yet the application, when it
is to be made, is very much similar in both instances. The
burden of proof has also been shifted in death cases. 372 Under
the Workmen's Compensation Law37 3 if an employer fails to
insure his employees, the employee may maintain an action in
the courts for damages on account of an injury received. Not
only shall it be unnecessary to plead or prove freedom from
contributory negligence, but even the defense of contributory
negligence may not be pleaded. 374 Jacobus v. Colgate375 may be
consulted for an explanation of the difference between rights
and remedies, the former pertaining to the law of the place of
occasion and the latter to the law of the forum.378 The acts
giving a right of recovery for negligence causing death generally
contain a time limitation. These short Statutes of Limitations
as7
of foreign jurisdictions have been applied by our courts 37
constituting a condition or part of the right of cause of action."
Thus it is seen that New York has had adequate experience with
comparative negligence, and in this connection three subordinate
questions arise:
(a) Did this Experience Reveal any Real Defect or Difficulty
in Application of the Rule or in its Administration?
The trial courts in the Rocco, 378 Hendricks379 andFitzpatrick8 0 cases
had no trouble with, and clearly charged the jury in accordance with
the rule of comparative negligence and diminution of damages provided by the special statutes. After the foreign law had been pleaded
and proven as fact in the Fitzpatrickcase, and had been madethe basis
of the court's instructions, no great or unusual intelligence on the
part of the jury was demanded in order for it to form a verdict according to the Ontario comparative negligence statute. The remedies
prescribed by the foreign statute must have been entirely capable of
adaptation to the forms of New York procedure, else the Court
3

7Citing Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 35 Sup. Ct. 865 (1915).

3

7Citing DECEDENT ESTATE LAW (CONs. LAWS, c. 13), § 131.
73
3 Citing Laws of 1922, c. 615, § ii: CONS. LAWS, c. 67.
37

'Citing Danielson v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 235 N. Y. 439, 139 N. E.
567, cert. den. 262 U. S. 756, 43 Sup. Ct. 703 (1923).
375217 N. Y. 235, 1n N. E. 837 (1916).
3 76
Citing Duggan v. Bay State Street Ry., 230 Mass. 370, Ii9 N.E. 757, L. R.A.
1918E, 680.
377
Citing Johnson v. Phoenix Bridge Co., 197 N. Y. 316, 90 N. E. 953 (1910).
378Supra note 359: Cf. Smith v. Delaware & H. R. R., 237 N. Y. Supp. 297,227
App. Div. 269 (3rd Dept. 1929); Wyatt v. N. Y. 0. & W. Ry., 45 F. (2d) 705
(C. C. A. 2nd 1930); Reynolds v. N. Y. 0. & W. Ry., 42 F. (2d) 164 (C. C. A. 2nd
38
3 9
OSupra note 361.
1 Supra note 355.
1930).
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of Appeals would have failed to unanimously uphold the trial court in
the Fitzgeraldcase, for where foreign law is contrary to public policy
in New York or is incapable of adaptation to our forms of procedure,
the court will refuse to enforce it.381
(b) What Major Change or Changes in Procedure or Substantive Law
Would be Brought About by Adoption of the ComparativeNegligence
Rule in New York?
If the rule were provided by statute, the statute would merely have
to be pleaded;3812trial court instructions would then follow the general
wording of the provisions of the act rather than the rule of contributory negligence, and the verdict would reveal a diminution of
plaintiff's damages according to the amount of his default. Further,
if either the legislature or the courts adopted a form of special verdict
under the comparative negligence rule such as that recently adopted
in Wisconsin, 8 then the procedure would be varied by submission
to the jury under such special verdict and by the jury's findings
according to that special verdict. However, the most important
and far-reaching change which would be produced in New York by
adoption of comparative negligence appears in the burden of proof
in negligence cases. As has been pointed out above, subject to certain
exceptions, 38 the burden of proof of lack of contributory negligence is
upon the plaintiff in New York, and is a substantive part of the
plaintiff's right." 5 Proof of defendant's negligence is not alone
sufficient to justify a recovery. Two elements are necessary, de38 1

Wikoff v. Hirschel, supra note 368; Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. R., 194 U. S.
Sup. Ct. 581 (1904); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N. Y.
99, 12o N. E. 198 (I918). In the last case, note that the Massachusetts statute
in consideration levied liability against a person or corporation causing death by
negligence, for "damages in the sum of not less than $5oo, nor more than $1o,ooo,
to be assessed with reference to the degree of his or its culpability." The Appellate
Division (172 App. Div. 227) held that a statute which graded damages in proportion to the negligence of defendant, which was penal rather than compensatory, and which was at variance with the law of this State, would not be enforced.
The Court of Appeals reversed.
38fBut see supra notes 340-342.
3
13See supra note 325 at 233-5; supra note 348 at 23-4; form of verdict follows
Hamus v. Weber, 199 Wis. 320, 226 N. W. 392 (1929). Cf. form of special verdict
120, 24

used in Montreal Tramways Co. v. McAllister, supra note 363 at 430 and 175.
3
uSupra notes 372-374. Under the Wisconsin special verdict, the burden of
proof is sometimes on the plaintiff and sometimes on the defendant, see supra
note 325 at 235. Also see EMPLOYERs' LIABILITY LAW (N. Y.) § 5, formerly §202-a
LABOR LAW (Laws 1910, c. 2.), making contributory negligence of the injured
employee
a defense to be so pleaded and proved by the defendant.
38
Fitzpatrick v. International Ry., supra note 361; see supra note 366.
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fendant's negligence and plaintiff's freedom from negligence, and
plaintiff must establish both of these elements in order to recover.
If the rule of comparative negligence were adopted it would be a
useless procedure which would demand of plaintiff that he negative
his contributory negligence, when it was no longer an essential
element of his cause of action. Contributory negligence would be
purely a defense pro tanto, to be pleaded and proven by the defendant, as it is at present under all statutes providing for the rule of
comparative negligence and diminution of damages.
(c) Are These Changes Desirable?
Pleading of the statute and correct charging by the trial court
involve little additional labor, in comparison with the far greater
justice reached under comparative negligence. It may be questioned
whether a special form of verdict is desirable. Wisconsin follows
the following form and submits to the jury these questions :381
i. Was defendant negligent?
2. Did defendant's negligence proximately cause the injury?

3. Was plaintiff negligent?
4. Was plaintiff's negligence a proximate cause of the injury?
5. Was plaintiff's negligence greater or less than defendant's?
6. What is the full damage plaintiff has sustained?
7. What is plaintiff's damage as diminished in the proportion
to the amount of negligence attributable to him?
8. What is the full damage sustained by defendant?
9. What is defendant's damage as diminished in proportion to
his negligence?
Submission of these special questions does help the jury to understand the rule of comparative negligence and to form the verdict in
accordance with it, but such special verdicts have been found cumbersome and unnecessary in most jurisdictions dealing with comparative
negligence, and may well be left to be given or refused in each case
within the discretion of the trial judge.
Placing the burden of proof of contributory negligence definitely
upon the defendant would prove beneficial rather than disadvantageous. It has always appeared to the authors that forcing plaintiff
to negative his contributory negligence is an anomaly in the law, in
that it makes plaintiff anticipate and disprove what should be considered a purely defensive matter,187 which otherwise might never
3
1Supra note 383.
387

Fernet v. Stewart, 163 App. Div. 112, 115, 148 N. Y. Supp. 646 (3rd Dept.
the amendment of the Labor Law and of the Code requiring
contributory negligence to be pleaded and proven as an affirmative defense, the
1914), "Before
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have been raised. The change would lighten the burdens of counsel
for plaintiff, and should result in a saving of time of the courts, which
instead of having to deal with the pleadings concerning contributory
negligence in every negligence case, would have to deal with that
problem only in those cases in which defendant affirmatively set up
the defense, and New York would be in line with the vast majority of
American jurisdictions.
3 88
5. Is the Wording of the ProposedNew York Act Ambiguous

The Georgia statutes,8 9 apparently demanding ordinary care on
the part of plaintiff, the Nebraska "slight-gross" negligence act 310
and the Wisconsin statute3 91 allowing recovery where plaintiff's
"negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against
whom recovery is sought", have each resulted in a reasonably just
comparison of the negligence of the parties and a proper diminution
of damages according to the default of the claimant; however, the
wording of each of these statutes has obvious defects which might
possibly have resulted in the very reverse of a beneficial change in the
law of negligence had they been construed by less liberal courts than
those which were called upon to administer them. The proposed New
York act, following the general wording of the Mississippi39 2 and
Federal Employers' Liability Acts, 393 provides more clearly for
comparative negligence in that it simply points out that no longer
shall contributory negligence be a complete defense, but shall be
merely a defense pro tanto according to the amount of plaintiff's
default. The Ontario Contributory Negligence Act 394 is considerably
more specific than any of the above statutes, and its wording would
seem to lead to less difficulty in judicial construction. It provides in
part that:
"In any action or counterclaim for damages hereafter brought,
which is founded upon fault or negligence, if a plea of conplaintiff was often denied relief because of the impossibility of obtaining proof as
to how the accident happened, so as to show that he was guiltless of contributory
negligence. It was deemed a harsh rule to put this burden upon the plaintiff,
especially in case of an accident resulting in death, and in any case it was deemed
that the burden of proof should properly be with the defendant to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the negligence of the party injured contributed to the result. To remedy these apparent inequities it is fair to presume.
that the change of rule was made by the Legislature, and the law should be so
construed as to give to a plaintiff in a negligence action the full benefit which it
was apparently contemplated that a plaintiff should have."
388
38
390
See s1upra note 334.
'Supra note 287.
Supra note 314.
391
392
Supra note 323.
Supra note 327.
"'See supra notes 345, 115, 116.
39Supra note 362.
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tributory fault or negligence shall be found to have been established, the jury, or the judge without a jury, shall find:First: The entire amount of damages to which the plaintiff
would have been entitled had there been no contributory fault
or neglect;
Secondly: The degree in which each party was in fault and the
manner in which the amount of damages found should be apportioned so that the plaintiff shall have judgment only for so
much thereof [i. e., so much of plaintiff's damage] as is proportionate to the degree of fault imputable to the defendant.
4. Where the judge or jury finds that it is not, upon the
evidence, practicable to determine the respective degrees of
fault the defendant shall be liable for one-half of the damages
sustained."
Does it not seem preferable that the proposed New York act should
conform to the wording of the Ontario act, since the latter covers
the field of comparative negligence with a greater degree of thoroughness, provides specifically the manner of apportionment of damages,
and definitely authorizes reduction of liability to one-half where it is
found impracticable to determine respective degrees of negligence
of the parties? However, other jurisdictions are satisfied merely to
set out the statutory rule of comparative negligence and to rely upon
judicial wisdom in solving the various problems of construction
which naturally arise under comparative negligence,395 and there is
no reason to expect the courts of New York to deviate from their
record of sound judgment if the comparative negligence doctrine
should be adopted in this state.
(a) Defects in the Proposed Act
The New York act as submitted to the Assembly was subject to
several interpretations:
i. 'Where both parties are guilty of contributory fault and each
sustains damage, one construction of the proposed act might be
that the total loss should be determined and the parties recover a
proportion of the total damages computed according to their respective fault as based upon that total loss.
2. The negligence of each party might be taken as a unit. For
example, suppose that the more derelict of the parties is chargeable
with complete lack of care, and the less guilty party is found to have
used only ten percent of the care which he should have used, then, if
39 6
the less guilty has suffered $i,ooo damage, he would recover but $ oo.
395

Supra note 348 at i.
396This possible construction, which is the least logical and least desirable of the
four suggested constructions, is discussed briefly by Padway, supra note 348 at 18.
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3. The proposed act could be construed as the Federal Employers'
Liability Act is, namely, that where both parties are negligent, the
plaintiff's total damages shall be diminished in the proportion that
plaintiff's own negligence bore to the combined negligence of both
plaintiff and defendant. 3 7
4. It might be construed to mean that in computing the net
judgment to be allowed, each should, as the first step in such computation, be allowed a tentative recovery from the other, but reduced
in each instance in proportion to the negligence displayed by him;
that is, where he is guilty of one-fourth of the total negligence involved, he recovers but three-fourths of the damages he otherwise
would have recovered had he been guilty of no negligence. For
example, according to the British proportional rule in admiralty,9 8
if ship A has sustained $ioo,ooo damage and ship B $5o,ooo, and

ship A is found guilty of one-fourth of the total negligence while ship
B is guilty of three-fourths of the negligence involved, A recovers
three-fourths of Sioo,ooo and B one-fourth of $5o,0o0. Result; net
recovery to A, $62,5o0.

39

'

The wording of the proposed bill would not indicate whether the
legislative intention is that an injured plaintiff should recover regardless of the degree of his negligence unless it were the sole proximate cause of the injury, or whether only a plaintiff less negligent
than the defendant should-recover. 40 The bill in no way considers
or provides for contribution between joint tort-feasors4'0 where all
parties are negligent, nor does it provide for a counterclaim40 2 by a
negligent defendant who has suffered loss in the same accident. If
a plaintiff more negligent than defendant could not recover under
the proposed act, it is obvious that a more negligent defendant
should not be allowed to recover upon a counterclaim in the same
action. However, if, as in Mississippi, it were held that a plaintiff
could recover unless his negligence were the sole proximate cause
of the injury, 403 defendant's counterclaim should be valid unless
defendant were the sole negligent party.
3 7

1 See lengthy annotation, 45 U. S. C. § 53 (1926) P. 379-434, and U. S. C.
Cum. ANN. Supp. (193I) p. 31-34.
398
Huger, ProportionalDamage Rule in Collisions at Sea, (1927) 13 COaNMEL
LAw QUARTERLY 531, 534, 540.
399

.fbid.540.
°°Note that the recent Wisconsin Act, supra note 323, provides that plaintiff, in
order to recover, must be less negligent than defendant.
40
IThe problem is discussed briefly in connection with the Wisconsin Act by
Padway,
supra note 348 at 17, 19.
40b21 . 17, 18.
403
Supra note 327; see supra notes 328-343.
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These defects and difficulties are merely suggested. They involve
considerable difficulty and are subject to various permutations and
combinations. The limits of space and imagination preclude exhaustive comment. We believe that court adjudication should iron
out these difficulties rather than that the legislature should attempt
to outline proper courses of action by detailed statutory enactment. To attempt in advance to avoid all questions and defects
by such enactment might hamper rather than aid the court. We are
warned against over-particularization by Wisconsin's recent experience with comparative negligence acts.ll A bill was submitted
to the Wisconsin legislature in 1925 based upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act and similar to the proposed New York act
except that it allowed recovery only where plaintiff's negligence was
not as great as defendant's. Later a substitute bill, providing specific
rules for the judicial administration of the law, was submitted to the
Assembly Judiciary Committee. In 1931, the Committee, changing
its mind, decided that the original bill should be adopted rather
than the more detailed substitute bill, for it was believed, with
excellent reason, that the courts should freely supervise application
of the rule of comparative negligence rather than that they should
be so limited by specific administrative rules. The vast number of
negligence decisions" 5 which have arisen under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and such state enactments as the Mississippi
comparative negligence act argue forcibly for adoption of the proposed New York act as it is now worded, since the constitutionality
of the act would be unquestioned0 6 and there is ready to hand a very
respectable body of precedent upon which to rely.
Comparative negligence will not be written into the law of New
York without a struggle. It will require and should enlist the support
of all who desire more exact justice in personal injury cases. If
enacted it will demand thought and study, but perplexing legal
problems have been effectively solved in the past, and the solution
of this problem should be hastened by the precedents available in
sister jurisdictions. The step is neither new nor revolutionary.
Steady encroachments upon the doctrine of contributory negligence
have weakened its claim of authority, and only respect for its age
can now be urged for its complete retention.
4

04Supra note 348 at i.

4

oSupra note 397.

'DOSu1'ra note 348 at 6; Cf. supra note 332.

